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THE  EQUITABLE  ANTI-INJUNCTION  ACT
Erin Morrow Hawley*
ABSTRACT
The Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 (AIA or the Act) has never been more important.  Origi-
nally enacted to expedite the collection of revenue-raising taxes, courts and scholars have for years
assumed that the statute imposes a jurisdictional bar on any pre-enforcement challenge to a tax.
On this interpretation, taxpayers subject to an invalid tax have two choices only: comply or pay
the tax and pursue a refund.  Read this way, the Act is a marked departure from the general rule
that pre-enforcement challenges are permissible so long as justiciability requirements are met.
And it imposes a marked burden on aggrieved taxpayers that grows all the more significant as the
federal government regulates more and more activity through the tax code.
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong.  Scholars—and courts—have
too readily relied on the Supreme Court’s past permissive use of the term jurisdiction.  But the
Supreme Court has recently backed away from this jurisprudence, and more to the point, the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation indicate that the AIA is not jurisdictional after all—
at least, not in the traditional way.
This Article examines the text, structure, history, and early interpretation of the AIA and
comes to a novel conclusion: the Act is not jurisdictional in the usual sense, but rather governs
the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.  While “equity jurisdiction” is now a term unfamiliar
to us, it governed the exercise of extraordinary remedies like injunctions for over a century.  And
it functioned much differently than jurisdiction does today.  That the AIA refers to equity juris-
diction will change the landscape of tax litigation: contrary to the conventional wisdom, pre-
enforcement tax challenges may go forward where the government waives or forfeits reliance on
the AIA and in certain extraordinary circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Whatever the Supreme Court says, there is a law for tax law alone—at
least in the enforcement context.1  The puzzle is this: pre-enforcement chal-
© 2014 Erin Morrow Hawley.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.  I would like to thank Judith
Resnick, Michael McConnell, Eugene Volokh, James E. Pfander, Amy Coney Barrett, Caleb
Nelson, Kristin E. Hickman, John O. McGinnis, Robert G. Bone, Randy E. Barnett, Carl H.
Esbeck, Allan R. Stein, Samuel L. Bray, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, John D. Inazu, William
Baude, Chad W. Flanders, and Joshua D. Hawley for their helpful comments.
1 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for
tax law only.”).
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lenges to statutes and regulations are generally allowed in the law.2  But not
for taxes.  In contrast to measures enacted under Congress’s other powers,
there is generally no such thing as the pre-enforcement review of a tax.  This
is all because of the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 (AIA or the Act),3 a statute
that bars a taxpayer who believes a tax to be unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid from bringing a preemptive suit.4  In order to have her day in court, a
taxpayer must pay the disputed tax—only then may she raise a constitutional
(or other) challenge in federal court, and only by way of a refund action.
The deeply embedded conventional wisdom is that the AIA is jurisdic-
tional.  If that is true, then the AIA’s limitation on pre-enforcement tax chal-
lenges is absolute.  The government may not waive the prohibition, a
meritorious excuse is irrelevant, and the federal courts have no authority to
craft equitable exceptions.
Consider the implications.  In National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius (NFIB), the recent litigation over the Affordable Care Act, the AIA
nearly prevented the Supreme Court from deciding whether the individual
mandate was constitutional—an outcome avoided only when the Court con-
cluded the fines in question were “penalties” for purposes of the statute
rather than “taxes.”5  There is an even stronger argument that the AIA
should have barred the Supreme Court from hearing Burrell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.,6 the case finding unconstitutional regulations requiring employ-
ers to provide contraceptive insurance coverage, precisely because Congress
labeled the penalties for non-compliance “taxes.”7  If the AIA applies, then
under the conventional view, the Supreme Court must dismiss.
Questions like these will only become more frequent as Congress
increasingly turns to the tax code to enforce various mandates of federal
law.8  Indeed, the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB9 practically invites Con-
2 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 41 (1991)
(explaining that injunctions, rather than damages, are the standard remedy in a wide
range of actions against the government).  The ability to sue is subject to justiciability con-
siderations like ripeness. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128
n.8 (2007) (discussing the “justiciability problem that arises[ ] when the party seeking
declaratory relief is himself preventing the complained-of injury from occurring”).
3 H.R. 1161, 39th Cong. (1867) (enacted).
4 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (“[Except as otherwise provided] no suit for the pur-
pose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.”).
5 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582–84 (2012).
6 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7 Erin Morrow Hawley, The Jurisdictional Question in Hobby Lobby, 124 YALE L.J. F. 63
(2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-jurisdictional-question-in-hobby-lobby;
see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1157 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gor-
such, J., concurring) (noting that “[c]ongress’s decision to label something a tax usually is
enough for it to trigger the AIA, ‘even where that label [is] inaccurate’” (citing NFIB, 132
S. Ct. at 2583)).
8 See e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717
(2014) (arguing that the IRS is no longer focused primarily on revenue raising).
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gress to use the taxing power for purposes of regulation rather than for its
other enumerated powers.10  And here is the point: if the conventional wis-
dom about the AIA is correct, the growing myriad regulatory tax penalties
are all but immune from pre-enforcement challenge.  Taxpayers subject to
an unconstitutional tax regulation have two choices only: comply with the
(invalid) regulation or pay the tax penalty and institute a refund action.
But what if the AIA is not jurisdictional?  This Article argues that the
conventional wisdom is wrong.  It depends upon a highly permissive view of
what counts as a jurisdictional requirement.  The Supreme Court, however,
recently has backed away from this overbroad conception of jurisdiction.
This new revisionist jurisprudence destabilizes the consensus view and directs
courts to return to text, structure, and context to determine whether a provi-
sion is in fact jurisdictional.
This Article does just that.  It examines the text, structure, and context
of the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 and its early interpretation.  This investiga-
tion reveals that the conventional wisdom is wrong: the AIA is not jurisdic-
tional in the traditional sense.  Moreover, because scholars and jurists
uniformly have disregarded or misread early caselaw interpreting the AIA,
they have missed discovering what it is that the statute actually does: it gov-
erns the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.
This category of “equitable jurisdiction” is one largely forgotten in our
law, but it governed the exercise of extraordinary remedies like injunctions
for over a century.  And it functioned much differently than jurisdiction does
today.  That the AIA refers to equity jurisdiction will change the landscape of
tax litigation—contrary to the conventional wisdom, pre-enforcement tax
challenges may go forward where the government waives or forfeits reliance
on the AIA and in certain extraordinary circumstances.
Recovering the concept of equitable jurisdiction also sheds new light on
the longstanding debate over the reach of various bars on the authority of
federal courts to grant equitable relief.  A series of “Anti-Injunction Acts”: the
Anti-Injunction Act of 1793, which governs federal-state injunctions; the Anti-
Injunction Act of 1867, which governs federal-federal tax injunctions; the
Johnson Act of 1934, which governs federal-state agency rate-making injunc-
tions; and the Tax Anti-Injunction Act of 1937, which governs federal-state
tax injunctions—have bedeviled courts and commentators.  Do these statutes
bar any and every exercise of jurisdiction?  Or do they instead allow for juris-
diction in the extraordinary case?  The Supreme Court’s answer has varied
over time and with the circumstances of each case.  This Article helps bring
clarity to this debate by recovering an understanding of equity practice that
may bear on the proper interpretation of all these “jurisdictional” bars.
Part I examines the judicial and scholarly consensus that the AIA is juris-
dictional.  Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent and destabilizing juris-
dictional decisions—decisions that cut back on an overly permissive use of
9 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
10 Id. at 2598–99 (explaining why Congress has the authority to impose the individual
mandate under its taxing power).
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the term “jurisdiction” and mandate a return to text, structure, and history.
Part III takes a fresh look at the text, structure, and history of the AIA and
concludes that the conventional wisdom is wrong: the AIA is not jurisdic-
tional, at least in the traditional sense.  Part IV examines early interpretations
of the AIA.  Often seen as incoherent, these early cases reveal a surprisingly
consistent line of precedent once one accounts for the equitable rules that
governed tax injunction suits prior to the AIA’s enactment.  This leads to a
novel interpretation: the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 governs the equitable
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Part V briefly develops the scope of an
equitable AIA, sketching out categories of cases in which pre-enforcement
review might be available.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The overwhelming academic consensus is that the AIA is a jurisdictional
statute.11  As Kevin Walsh put it, the AIA “easily satisfies the test for a jurisdic-
11 See Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection
Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 58 (2004) (noting that “[p]ost-assessment, pre-
collection review is generally prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act”); John K. DiMugno,
The Affordable Care Act After the Supreme Court’s Ruling, 22 EXPERIENCE 10, 13 (2013) (noting
that “the Anti-Injunction Act would appear to deprive the Court of jurisdiction”); George
A. Hani, Supreme Court Preview: Department of Health and Human Services v. State of Flor-
ida, 2012 WTR INSIDE BASIS 8, 8 (“The AIA has long been held to be a jurisdictional statute.
Therefore where the AIA applies, it deprives the Court of jurisdiction over the case.” (cit-
ing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749 (1974))); Stewart Jay, On Slippery Constitu-
tional Slopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1184 (2012) (referring to the
AIA as a “jurisdictional statute[ ]”); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 n.275 (2012) (stating that the AIA deprives courts of jurisdiction);
Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the Extension of Indi-
rect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. 639, 653 n.62 (2012) (describing
the “Anti-Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar”); Robert J. Muise & David Yerushalmi, Wear-
ing the Crown of Solomon? Chief Justice Roberts and the Affordable Care Act “Tax,” 38 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 291, 292 (2013) (arguing that the AIA, if applicable, “would have likely
deprived the Court of jurisdiction” over pre-enforcement review of mandate); Cono R.
Namorato & Gerald A. Feffer, Financial and Criminal Sanctions for Noncompliance with the
Internal Revenue Code: Representing a Taxpayer in a Grand Jury Investigation, C419 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY 143, 160 (1989) (“[T]he Anti-Injunction Act . . . withdraws the jurisdic-
tion of all courts to hear suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of taxes.”);
Kevin C. Walsh, The Anti-Injunction Act, Congressional Inactivity, and Pre-enforcement Challenges
to § 5000A of the Tax Code, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 823, 828 (2012) (“[T]he AIA is jurisdic-
tional.”); id. at n.18 (“[T]he text of the [AIA] easily satisfies the test for a jurisdictional
bar.”); Steven Weiss, Undoing the IRS Wrongful Levy, 106 BANKING L.J. 336, 338 (1989)
(“[T]he Anti-Injunction Act . . . provides that, except in limited circumstances, courts are
without jurisdiction to enjoin the IRS on the lawful collection of taxes.”); Jack F. Williams,
National Bankruptcy Review Commission Tax Recommendations: Notice, Jurisdiction, and Corporate
Debtors, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 261, 289 (1998) (“The Anti-Injunction Act . . . generally den[ies]
a court the jurisdiction to determine the prospective tax consequences of an event or trans-
action.”); Bryan T. Camp, Jesus and the Anti-Injunction Act, TAX NOTES, Sept. 2012, at 1335
(arguing that the AIA is jurisdictional); Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special”
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tional bar.”12  The statute, according to Walsh, “clearly governs a court’s
‘adjudicatory capacity.’”13  Writing about the Affordable Care Act litigation
in her Supreme Court Foreword, Pam Karlan agreed that the AIA is jurisdic-
tional.14  “Had the [§ 5000A] payment been construed as a tax for purposes
of the Anti-Injunction Act,” Karlan wrote, “the Court would have been
deprived of jurisdiction, and determination of the constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision would have had to await a suit after 2014 by an
individual who made the payment and then sued for a refund.”15  And while
Michael Dorf and Neil Siegel do not address the question themselves, they
wrote of “directly” on-point Supreme Court precedent for the proposition
that the AIA is “a limit on federal court jurisdiction.”16
Further, in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB schol-
ars devised novel ways of reading either the AIA or the Affordable Care Act’s
§ 5000A penalty to avoid their intersection—analyses predicated on avoiding
a jurisdictional AIA.  Dorf and Siegel, for example, wrote that the AIA did not
apply to the Affordable Care Act since the challenges at issue in NFIB did not
have the “purpose” of immediately restraining tax assessment or collection.17
Others have argued that the Affordable Care Act’s penalty does not qualify as
a tax for purposes of the AIA.18  Despite the barrage of articles presenting
various grounds upon which the Supreme Court could avoid application of
the AIA to the Affordable Care Act, scholars did not contend that the AIA
was not jurisdictional.19
For their part, the federal courts are unanimous in their conclusion that
the AIA is jurisdictional.20  Indeed, the Affordable Care Act litigation pro-
Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage
Provision, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389, 394 (2012) (assuming that the AIA is jurisdictional).
12 Walsh, supra note 11, at 828 n.18.
13 Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)).
14 See Karlan, supra note 11, at 46 n.275 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Naviga-
tion Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)).
15 Id.
16 Dorf & Siegel, supra note 11, at 400 n.50.
17 Id. at 400.
18 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 11, at 834–38.
19 My research has revealed only one article, written in Tax Notes by practitioner Pat-
rick J. Smith, which suggests that the AIA may not be jurisdictional because the Supreme
Court’s recent AIA cases were not well-considered. See Patrick J. Smith, Is the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act Jurisdictional?, TAX NOTES, Nov. 2011, at 1104.
20 See, e.g., RYO Mach., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 696 F.3d 467, 470 (6th Cir.
2012); Pagonis v. United States, 575 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2009); Hansen v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 528 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Anti–Injunction Act precludes federal
jurisdiction over Hansen’s claims unless he is able to satisfy the judicially created exception
to the Act by demonstrating (1) irreparable injury if his case is not heard, and (2) certainty
of success on the merits.”); Gardner v. United States, 211 F.3d 1305, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Int’l Lotto Fund v. Va. State Lottery Dep’t, 20 F.3d 589, 591 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the AIA withdraws federal court jurisdiction); Flynn v. United States, 786 F.2d 586, 588 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding the same); Lange v. Phinney, 507 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding the same); see also Hawley, supra note 7, 67 n.33.
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vided recent and focused attention on the jurisdictional status of the AIA;
every federal court to confront the issue determined that the AIA is jurisdic-
tional.  In early 2011, the Fourth Circuit squarely held that “the AIA divests
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.”21  Writing for the Sixth Circuit,
Judge Sutton agreed: the AIA “goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts.”22  In his dissent from the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding
the Affordable Care Act, Judge Kavanaugh argued that the court should dis-
miss the case because the Anti-Injunction Act is jurisdictional.23  Moreover,
all of the federal courts and judges (including the Supreme Court) to con-
clude that the AIA does not bar review of challenges to the individual man-
date have done so on the ground that Congress intended § 5000A to operate
as a penalty, not a tax.24
The litigation over the employer contraception requirement created a
small chink in the unanimity of the federal judiciary.25  Judge Gorsuch,
joined by two colleagues, concluded that the AIA likely applied to the contra-
ception mandate but did not satisfy the Supreme Court’s recent clear state-
ment test for jurisdictional statutes.26  This separate opinion, to put it mildly,
is an outlier.  It did not command a majority of the appellate court, and the
Supreme Court glossed over the issue entirely, failing to address the AIA at
all.
NFIB provides the latest from the Supreme Court.27  Three different
views of the AIA were presented during briefing and again at oral argument.
The government argued that the AIA was jurisdictional but did not apply to
the Affordable Care Act because 26 U.S.C. § 5000A was a penalty rather than
a tax.28  The States and NFIB argued that the AIA was not jurisdictional, and
since the federal government had forfeited its defense under that statute, the
21 Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme
Court has explicitly so held.”), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012).
22 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
23 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 26–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting),
abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
24 See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1130–42 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (concluding that the individual mandate imposes a
penalty and not a tax); see also Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 539 (“The relevant termi-
nology suggests that we may hear this action.  While the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to
‘tax[es],’ . . . Congress called the shared-responsibility payment a ‘penalty.’” (quoting 26
U.S.C. §§ 7421(a), 5000A (2012))).
25 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
26 See id. at 1157–59 (“[T]he AIA shows none of the hallmarks of a jurisdictional
restriction, and has many features that collectively indicate otherwise.”).
27 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84 (holding that, for purposes of the statute, § 5000A
imposes penalties, not taxes).
28 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2–4, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (“[T]he
fact that the minimum coverage provision is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing
power does not compel the conclusion that the Anti-Injunction Act . . . bars this suit.”); see
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–54, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
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Supreme Court had no need to address whether the Act might apply.29
Court-appointed amicus Robert Long, claimed that the Act was jurisdictional
and the penalty imposed by § 5000A was a tax.30
The Supreme Court sided with the government and held that § 5000A
imposed a penalty and not a tax—at least for statutory purposes.  Congress’s
choice “to describe the ‘[s]hared responsibility payment’ imposed on those
who forgo health insurance not as a ‘tax,’ but as a ‘penalty’” was dispositive.31
This nomenclature indicated that Congress had not intended the payment to
be subject to the AIA.32  Because the AIA did not apply, the Supreme Court
had no occasion to consider whether the Act is jurisdictional.  The tenor of
its opinion nevertheless suggests that, were the question presented, it would
view the Act through a jurisdictional lens.33  “Before turning to the merits,”
the Court wrote in assessing the AIA, “we need to be sure we have the author-
ity to do so.”34
In modern times, scholars and courts have confidently assumed that the
AIA is jurisdictional.  They should not be so certain.  On closer inspection,
the conventional wisdom turns out to be premised almost entirely on what we
will call the Supreme Court’s modern doctrine of jurisdiction, which is
founded on a highly permissive use of the word “jurisdiction.”  The Supreme
Court recently has launched a major revision of that jurisprudence, however,
acknowledging that its previous use of the jurisdictional label has been, at
best, imprecise.  The time has come, the Court has said, to be more careful:
to look to the text, structure, and context of a given statute to decide if its
provisions really count as jurisdictional limits.  This revisionist turn is fatal for
the conventional wisdom because, as we shall see, the text, structure, context,
and early interpretations all indicate that the AIA is not a jurisdictional stat-
ute, at least not in the traditional sense.  The AIA governs instead the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  I begin with a brief look at the role of the
Court’s revisionist turn, before turning to the text, structure, and context of
the AIA.
29 See Reply Brief for Private Respondents at 3–10, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398)
(referring to “[t]he AIA’s fundamentally non-jurisdictional character”); Reply Brief for
State Respondents at 3–9, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (“[T]he federal government
maintains that this Court must address [the AIA] anyway because it is jurisdictional.  The
federal government is mistaken.”).
30 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583–84 (“According to amicus, by directing that the penalty
be ‘assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes,’ § 5000A(g)(1) made the Anti-
Injunction Act applicable to this penalty.”).
31 Id. at 2582–83 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(b), (g)(2) (2012)).
32 See id. at 2582; see also id. at 2656 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What qualifies as a tax for
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, unlike what qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Con-
stitution, is entirely within the control of Congress.”).
33 See id. at 2582 (majority opinion).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S REVISIONIST TURN
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has undergone a funda-
mental shift in the way it regards procedural requirements, like filing dead-
lines or exhaustion requirements, imposed by Congress.  Historically the
Court strictly interpreted such requirements, adopting, in effect, a presump-
tion in favor of jurisdictional treatment.35  The modern court expanded
upon this tradition, resorting to a highly permissive use of the term jurisdic-
tion.36  Beginning in 1998, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, how-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed course, noting that the term “jurisdiction”
had become “a word of many, too many, meanings.”37  Because the Supreme
Court had been overinclusive in its use of the term, referring to non-jurisdic-
tional provisions as jurisdictional,38 it would reevaluate whether jurisdictional
holdings were really jurisdictional.39  This revisionist turn has sparked a
revolution of sorts.  Indeed, the Court’s reexamination of past precedent has
been so searching that it led Justice Scalia, the author of Steel Co., to remark
that “[w]hat began as an effort to bring some discipline to the use of the
term jurisdictional shows signs of becoming a libertine, liberating romp
through our established jurisprudence.”40
In reexamining its past precedent, the Supreme Court has sought to dis-
tinguish between “claims-processing” rules and truly jurisdictional provisions.
Jurisdictional statutes speak to the very power of the federal court to hear a
case; they govern the court’s “adjudicatory authority.”41  In contrast, claims-
processing rules simply “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by
requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified
times.”42
To distinguish between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional limita-
tions, the Supreme Court has begun to look to text, structure, and context.
35 See, e.g., Mussina v. Cavazos, 73 U.S. 355, 358 (1867) (“We have repeatedly held that
the writ of error in cases at law is essential to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of
this court.”); see also Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the
Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 19) (on
file with author).
36 See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006) (noting that the Court “has
sometimes been profligate in its use of the term” jurisdiction).
37 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (citing United States v.
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
38 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–11 (explaining, for example, that the Court had
referred to a non-extendable time limit as jurisdictional, even though the Court’s recent
jurisprudence indicates that such limits are not jurisdictional).
39 See Steel Co., 532 U.S. at 91 (holding that “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” would
“have no precedential effect”).
40 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 663 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (noting
that “subject-matter jurisdiction” refers to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case”).
42 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011).
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First, the Court employs “a clear-statement principle”43 to determine
whether the text “clearly states” that the precondition is jurisdictional.44  The
Court then considers whether the structure of the statute compels a jurisdic-
tional conclusion.45  In particular, the Court considers whether the precondi-
tion to suit is located in the jurisdiction-granting provision, a finding that
would support jurisdictional scope,46 and whether there are any other struc-
tural statutory factors, such as congressional exceptions to the precondition,
that would suggest that the text does not speak in jurisdictional terms.47
The Supreme Court’s revisionist turn is not without its ambiguities.  The
Court also looks to context, which sometimes includes past precedent.48
This is in some tension with its general clear statement approach.  In two
cases in particular, Bowles v. Russell,49 and John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States,50 the Supreme Court found past precedent, not a clear statement from
Congress, to be dispositive.51  Noting the tension between the precedent-
based rationale in these cases and the requirement that Congress “clearly
state[ ] that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdic-
tional,”52 the Court has sought to moor the cases in some form of congres-
sional intent by relying on congressional acquiescence.53  Putting to one side
43 See id. (“[W]e look to see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the
rule to be ‘jurisdictional.’” (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16)).
44 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 163 (2010).
45 Id. at 163–65.
46 Id. at 164–65.
47 Id. at 165 (“It would be at least unusual to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a
condition subject to these sorts of exceptions.”); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393–94, 397 (1982) (holding that a statutory exemption from an EEOC filing
requirement supports a nonjurisdictional reading of that requirement).
48 See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168.
49 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding the appellate filing deadlines contained within
§ 2107(a) jurisdictional).
50 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (holding the general six-year federal statute of limitation con-
tained in § 2501 jurisdictional).
51 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139 (relying exclusively on “[b]asic princi-
ples of stare decisis”); Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (finding dispositive that the Court “has long
held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdic-
tional’” (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per
curiam))).
52 Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 515 (2006)); see also id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (recognizing “undeniable tension” between Bowles and Arbaugh).
53 In Henderson, the Court explained John R.’s stare decisis holding as one based on
context and congressional acquiescence: “When a long line of this Court’s decisions left
undisturbed by Congress, has treated a similar requirement as jurisdictional, we will pre-
sume that Congress intended to follow that course.”  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shin-
seki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the Court has recast Bowles as “relying on a long line of this Court’s decisions left
undisturbed by Congress.”  Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 82
(2009); see also Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 171–74 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (reconciling decisions based on congressional acquiescence).
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the Court’s problematic endorsement of congressional acquiescence in situa-
tions where Congress has not addressed the issue,54 Bowles and John R. Sand
& Gravel Co. make clear that a “long line” of past precedent may tip the
jurisdictional scales.55
In sum, the Court’s revisionist turn teaches that a procedural require-
ment is not automatically “a jurisdictional prerequisite.”56  Instead, the Court
looks to text, structure, and context.57  But what does the text, structure, and
context of the AIA reveal?  That the statute is not jurisdictional.
III. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
A. Text
The first question under the Supreme Court’s revisionist jurisprudence
is one of text.58  The legislature must “clearly state[ ] that a threshold limita-
tion on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.”59  The text of the AIA,
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), provides:
Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b),
6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1),
7429(b), and 7436, no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether
or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.60
Although the text of the AIA is an unqualified prohibition of suit except
for certain provided circumstances, the Supreme Court has long recognized
that a provision may be mandatory and binding on litigants, yet stop short of
requiring jurisdictional treatment.61  Several features of the AIA’s language
54 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69
(1988) (“Generally, when the Court finds meaning in Congress’ inaction, it points to spe-
cific legislative consideration of the issue and, either implicitly or explicitly, indicates that
Congress’ failure to act bespeaks a probable intent to reject the alternative(s).”).
55 See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (“When a long line of this Court’s decisions left
undisturbed by Congress has treated a similar requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will pre-
sume that Congress intended to follow that course.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
56 Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982)).
57 See id. (“[T]he jurisdictional analysis must focus on the ‘legal character’ of the
requirement . . . which we discerned by looking to the condition’s text, context, and rele-
vant historical treatment.” (quoting Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393–95)); see also Nat’l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (stating that “our most salient source for
guidance is the statutory text”).
58 See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that “[n]othing in the
text of Title VII indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure
that the employee-numerosity requirement is met”).
59 Id. at 515.
60 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
61 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 (2012) (rejecting “the notion that ‘all
mandatory prescriptions, however emphatic, are . . . properly typed jurisdictional’” (quot-
ing Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (2011))); Dolan v.
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suggest that, while the statute may be mandatory, it is a nonjurisdictional
claims-processing rule, rather than a jurisdictional limitation imposed on fed-
eral courts.
To begin, the text of the AIA does not mention jurisdiction in so many
words.  That fact is not alone dispositive.62  But it is apiece with the claims-
channeling nature of the AIA.  The AIA establishes the method and timing of
judicial review; it requires litigants to pay a tax before disputing it in a refund
action.63  The Act is, in other words, part of an exhaustion regime that
focuses on conditions litigants must fulfill to have their day in court, not the
adjudicatory authority of the federal courts.64
Exhaustion requirements are “quintessential claims-processing rules.”65
Because they “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring
that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,”66 the
Supreme Court often has held threshold exhaustion requirements nonjuris-
dictional.67  In Jones v. Bock, for example, the Supreme Court held that the
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) administrative exhaustion require-
ment—“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . .
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”68—was not
jurisdictional.  The precondition to suit did not implicate the adjudicatory
authority of the court.69
The Court’s new precedent, moreover, makes clear that exhaustion
regimes may be applied to specific claims by specific litigants (e.g., prisoners
raising prison condition claims and copyright holders raising validity claims)
without transforming a nonjurisdictional condition into a jurisdictional one.
That the PLRA was addressed to a particular type of claim, i.e., ones challeng-
ing prison conditions, did not make the condition jurisdictional.70  So too for
United States, 560 U.S. 605, 611 (2010) (holding that “shall” does not render a precondi-
tion jurisdictional).
62 See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (holding that “magic words” are unnecessary).
63 See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 374 (1984) (holding that the AIA “was
merely intended to require taxpayers to litigate their claims in a designated proceeding”).
The “by any person” language added in 1966 clarifies that the AIA speaks to the parties,
not the courts.  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (incorporating the 1966 amendment language).
Indeed, the AIA was enacted as an addendum to the tax code’s administrative-exhaustion
requirement and thus intended to bar suit “only in situations in which Congress had pro-
vided the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of
a particular tax.” 465 U.S. at 373.
64 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes
speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
65 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203.
66 Id.
67 See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 n.6 (2010) (citing Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007)).
68 Jones, 549 U.S. at 204 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
69 See id. at 221.
70 See id. at 221–22.
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the registration requirement imposed as a precondition to suit on a certain
subset of copyright infringement claims by § 411(a) of the Copyright Act.71
Because the AIA is concerned with the manner and timing of review, it
does not appear to implicate the adjudicatory authority of the federal courts.
And like other exhaustion regimes, the AIA does not forever bar federal
court review of a class of cases (as does the Tax Injunction Act), but instead
assumes that suits blocked by the AIA eventually will end up in federal court.
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick is instructive.72  In that case, the Court con-
sidered whether § 411(a) of the Copyright Act—“no civil action for infringe-
ment of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted” until the
copyright is registered—is jurisdictional.73  Like the AIA, § 411(a) is
addressed to particular litigants (owners of unregistered copyrights),
couched in mandatory terms, and is part of a remedial scheme.  Because the
statute placed conditions on plaintiffs (and not the federal courts), the Court
found that § 411(a) did not “clearly state[ ]” that its registration requirement
was jurisdictional.74
In sum, the text of the AIA does not clearly indicate jurisdictional status.
The statute does not employ jurisdictional language, it is addressed to private
litigants, and it is part of an exhaustion regime that eventually provides for
federal court review.
B. Structure
The structure of the AIA similarly indicates that the provision is a
“claims-processing” rule that directs litigants to a refund action rather than a
jurisdictional bar on federal court review.75
To begin, the AIA is not located in a jurisdiction-granting provision; it
resides in a miscellaneous tax code section that governs procedure and
administration.  That the AIA “is located in a provision ‘separate’ from those
granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over [the] respective
claims” supports a nonjurisdictional reading of the AIA.76  More specifically,
federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal tax dis-
putes based on the general federal question grant contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1331.  And of course § 1331 does not “condition[ ] its jurisdictional
grant” on whether taxes have been paid.77
71 See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157–58 (finding that a condition imposed on a particu-
lar type of infringement claim was not jurisdictional).
72 See id.
73 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)).
74 Id. at 163.
75 See id. at 163–65; Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205
(2011); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006).
76 Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 164.
77 Id. at 165 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1338(a) do not “condition[ ]” juris-
diction on whether “copyright holders have registered their works before suing for
infringement”); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (“Title VII’s jurisdictional provision” does
not “specif[y] any threshold ingredient akin to 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s monetary floor.”).
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Moreover, it is important that the AIA allows federal courts to provide
pre-enforcement review of tax challenges in some situations.  The Reed
Elsevier Court found it “significant[ ]” that § 411(a) permitted the adjudica-
tion of unregistered claims in three circumstances.78  The AIA is littered with
no less than fourteen statutory exceptions.79  For example, a taxpayer who
receives a deficiency notice may file suit notwithstanding the AIA.80  So too
for taxpayers who are innocent joint filers,81 who have a third-party interest
in property82 and whose property have been levied.83  The existence of so
many exceptions suggests that Congress did not intend to limit the power of
federal courts to hear all pre-enforcement challenges but only to require tax-
payers to follow the proper procedures.84
The purpose of the AIA also suggests that it is not a jurisdictional stat-
ute.85  Efficient administration of the tax code lies at the heart of the Act.86
Congress enacted the AIA to prevent federal courts from interfering “with
the process of collecting the taxes on which the government depends for its
continued existence,”87 and “to require that the legal right to the disputed
78 Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 165 (finding it “significant[ ]” that the AIA “expressly
allows courts to adjudicate [unexhausted] claims”).
79 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
80 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a), (c).
81 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e).
82 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1), (b).
83 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the
beginning of a levy or proceeding during the time the suspension under this paragraph is
in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the Tax Court.”);
26 U.S.C. § 6672(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the beginning
of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by
a proceeding in the proper court.”); 26 U.S.C. § 6694(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 7421(a), the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such
prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.”); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7426(b) (“The district court shall have jurisdiction to grant” an injunction to prohibit
the enforcement of such levy or to prohibit such sale as “appropriate”); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7429(b) (authorizing review of jeopardy levy or assessment).
84 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 165 (2010) (“It would be at least
unusual to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a condition subject to these sorts of excep-
tions.”); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94, 397 (1982) (stat-
ing that Congress’s approval of Title VII relief to claimants who had not complied with the
EEOC filing requirement supports a nonjurisdictional reading of that requirement).
85 Legislative purpose is in some tension with the clear statement requirement, but the
Court has resorted to it in jurisdictional cases. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shin-
seki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) (finding that Congress could not have intended for the
deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court “to carry the harsh conse-
quences that accompany the jurisdiction tag”).
86 See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (“The mani-
fest purpose of § 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged
to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed
sums be determined in a suit for refund.  In this manner the United States is assured of
prompt collection of its lawful revenue.”).
87 State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613 (1875).
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sums be determined in a suit for refund.”88  As the government has
explained, these purposes may be best served by pre-enforcement review.
In Helvering v. Davis,89 for example, a shareholder brought suit to
restrain the Edison Corporation from deducting payroll taxes as required by
the Social Security Act.90  The Commissioner of Internal Revenue inter-
vened.91  In light of the serious budgetary and administrative problems that
would result from a delay in determining the validity of the Social Security
tax, the government sought pre-enforcement review.92  And when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, the government argued that the Court
should proceed to the merits of the case notwithstanding the AIA: the core
purposes of the statute were best served by prompt resolution.93  The AIA,
the government explained, “was enacted to promote, not to discourage, the
orderly administration and collection of Government revenues.”94  In Helver-
ing, “the litigation of an injunction suit [was] more important for the protec-
tion of the revenues than insistence upon adherence to the ordinary
procedure of payment followed by a suit for refund.”95
Helvering was not a one-off decision.  The government also sought pre-
enforcement review of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 in Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins,96 “expressly waiv[ing]” its “ ‘defense’” under the AIA.97
Similarly, the government urged the Court to review the constitutionality of a
tax prior to its enforcement in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,98 and
“explicitly waived” any question as to jurisdiction.99  Most recently, the gov-
ernment sought pre-enforcement review of the constitutionality of § 5000A,
the individual mandate, arguing that the Supreme Court should decide
whether the penalty was constitutional before any person had paid it.100
In short, situations exist where the “primary purpose” of the AIA—“ena-
bling the prompt and efficient assessment and collection of taxes on which
88 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974) (quoting Williams Packing, 370
U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court has also identified “a collateral
objective of the Act—protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund.”
Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7–8.
89 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
90 Id. at 619.
91 Id.
92 Brief for Petitioners at 22–23, Helvering, 301 U.S. 619 (No. 36-910).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 31.
95 Id.
96 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
97 Brief for the Appellee at 9, Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 381 (No. 804).
98 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reh’g granted and opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
99 Id. at 554 (“[S]o far as it was within the power of the government to do so, the
question of jurisdiction, for the purposes of the case, was explicitly waived on the
argument.”).
100 Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 2, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391
(4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2347), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012) (explaining that the government
had reconsidered its position on the AIA and “concluded that the [Act] does not foreclose
the exercise of jurisdiction in these cases”).
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the government’s operations depend”101—is best served by pre-enforcement
review.  To accord the AIA jurisdictional status would in every case preclude
the prompt review of a tax statute.  As the government argued in Helvering,
this would “discourage” rather than encourage “the orderly administration
and collection of Government revenues.”102  The core purpose of the AIA,
and its structure more generally, thus suggest that the Act is not
jurisdictional.
C. Context
The Supreme Court’s revisionist jurisdictional doctrine looks to context,
which includes an assortment of statutory interpretation tools like history,
the interpretation of similar statutes, and—the factor that has received the
most attention in NFIB and other cases—past precedent.  The context
inquiry demonstrates that the AIA is not jurisdictional.
History.  The clear statement approach may preclude resort to legislative
history,103 but in all events, the AIA’s legislative history does not clearly indi-
cate that Congress intended the provision to carry jurisdictional water.
Indeed, the statute, the Court has remarked, “apparently has no recorded
legislative history.”104
Still, some indicators of congressional motive can be gleaned from con-
text.  In 1867, Senator Fessenden, Chairman of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee,105 offered the AIA as an amendment to section 19 of the Internal
Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, which requires the exhaustion of administra-
tive tax remedies.106  The amendment was part of a much larger reconstruc-
tion bill, House Bill 1161, aimed at maintaining revenues sufficient to pay
down Civil War debt, lowering Civil War income tax rates, and setting specific
tax rates on a whole host of items, like whiskey and tobacco.107  The House of
Representatives agreed to the amendment only after conference, but no
101 Brief for Petitioners at 5–6, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
102 Brief for Petitioners at 31, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (No. 36-910).
103 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 989 (4th ed. 2007) (“Even if there were a coherent
legislative ‘intent’ (a matter Scalia disputes), it would have no authority as law under the
Constitution.”).
104 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974); see also Note, Enjoining the
Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109
n.9 (1935) (“[T]he amendment’s progress was devoid of reported comment.”).
105 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1933, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1979, 1997 (1867)
(wherein other senators address Senator Fessenden as “the chairman of the Committee on
Finance”).
106 Internal Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, ch. 184 § 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152 (“[N]o suit
shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been errone-
ously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the com-
missioner of internal revenue . . . .”).
107 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1939 (1867) (repeatedly referring to H.R.
1161 as a bill “to amend existing laws relating to internal revenue”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 16  8-DEC-14 14:35
96 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
record of any negotiations exist.108  And despite statements indicating that
the Senate Finance Committee and the Conference Committee each pre-
pared a report, neither report nor any other legislative history appears to
exist.109
As originally proposed by Senator Fessenden, the amendment precluded
any “suit in equity or otherwise for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of tax [from being] maintained in any court.”110  We have no
record of when or why the “in equity or otherwise” language was dropped
from the amendment, but the bill as reported out of conference no longer
referred to suits in equity.111  The deletion of the phrase may represent a
compromise between two competing purposes of House Bill 1161: to provide
the IRS with more enforcement authority vis-a`-vis tax cheats and to rein in
well-documented abuses of authority by undertrained and corrupt IRS
agents.
Given the latter concern, it is unlikely that a jurisdictional AIA would
have passed without debate.  Indeed, just minutes before Senator Fessenden
proposed the AIA, Senator Davis, a Democrat from Kentucky, offered an
amendment that would have taken the power to remit or mitigate fines away
from the Treasury Department and given it to the courts.112  The Senate
rejected the amendment, but only after Senator Fessenden spoke in favor of
the status quo113:
The universal system has been in all our revenue laws to leave these matters
to be relieved by the proper authorities, if they are satisfied, on the whole,
that the relief ought to be given; and I hope that the system which has always been
in operation will not be changed now.  It is difficult enough to procure a convic-
tion for a breach of the revenue law, and this will make it more so. I hope the
Senate will not interfere with a system so well established.114
Senator Fessenden, then, regarded the well-established system as appro-
priate.  This system provided for equitable review of taxes in limited circum-
108 See id. at 1949 (describing a message from the House of Representatives requesting
a conference on the disagreement between the House and the Senate concerning the Sen-
ate’s amendments to House Bill 1161); id. at 1968 (reporting the agreements reached
during the conference).
109 See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 387 n.4 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“No other recorded legislative history has been uncovered.”); Israel Herman
Gorovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases, TAX MAG., Dec. 1932, at 446 n.6
(“[N]either the House nor Senate committee reports are on file at the Library of Congress
or the Government Printing Office.  It is probable, therefore, that they were not printed.”);
Note, supra note 104, at 109 n.9 (“[T]he amendment’s progress was devoid of reported
comment.”).
110 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1933 (1867) (emphasis added).
111 Id.; see also H.R. 1161, 39th Cong. (1867) (enacted).
112 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1932 (1867) (emphasis added).
113 See id. at 1933.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
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stances.115  Moreover, while many senators expressed concerns over rampant
tax evasion, none expressed any concerns over judicial meddling.
In short, the sparse legislative record does not clearly indicate that Con-
gress intended the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 to be jurisdictional.  If Con-
gress had intended the AIA to strip the federal courts of all jurisdiction over
tax cases (at least prior to exhausting an administrative appeal and paying
the disputed tax), one would think the issue would have been discussed on
the floor of either the House or Senate—especially given concerns about
abusive and corrupt agency officials.  One would also expect the government
to advance the no-jurisdiction position on the heels of the AIA’s enactment.
And one would expect leading equity and taxation experts of the day to
devote substantial paragraphs, if not pages, to explaining the effects of the
Act.  But no mention of the AIA exists in the House or Senate debates, the
government asserted the power to waive the AIA defense in early cases (a
position inconsistent with a jurisdictional measure), and the leading equity
and tax treatises of the day (published in 1881) do not so much as mention
the AIA.116
Moreover, there was no pressing need to foreclose federal jurisdiction
because such jurisdiction over tax challenges rarely existed.  General federal
question jurisdiction had yet to be conferred on the federal courts, and in
1867, the only way a taxpayer could challenge a tax in federal court was by
suing a non-diverse defendant.117  Since the agent responsible for collection
115 See infra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
116 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION (Chicago, Callahan &
Co. 2d ed. 1881); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 129, at
111–13 (San Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1st ed. 1881).
117 In 1833, with states threatening to annul customs laws, Congress conferred on the
circuit courts jurisdiction of “all cases, in law or equity, arising under the revenue laws of
the United States, for which other provisions are not already made.”  Force Act of 1833, ch.
57, § 2, 4 Stat. 632, 632.  Under the Force Act, as it was known, a taxpayer could file suit
against a collector, though a citizen of the same state. Id. at 632–33.  The Force Act also
gave collectors the right to remove an action arising under the revenue laws to federal
court. Id. at 633–34.  It was initially unclear whether the Force Act’s grant of jurisdiction
applied to suits challenging the Civil War income taxes.  Congress said yes in section 50 of
the Internal Revenue Act of 1864.  Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 50, 13 Stat. 223, 241.  In
1866, however, Congress changed its mind, repealing section 50 of the 1864 Act and speci-
fying that the Force Act would not apply to cases arising under internal revenue (as
opposed to customs) laws.  Internal Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, ch. 184, §§ 67–68, 14
Stat. 98, 171–72.  The 1866 Internal Revenue Law kept in place a provision for removal to
federal court by the collecting agent. Id.  After 1866, then, the federal courts had limited
jurisdiction over federal tax controversies: the parties must either be diverse or the collect-
ing agent must remove the action to federal court. Id.; Assessors v. Osbornes, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 567, 572 (1869); City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 729–30
(1866).  Bryan Camp argues that the AIA was intended to plug the statutory hole that
sometimes allowed courts to exercise their equity jurisdiction before a tax had been paid.
Camp, supra note 11, at 1336.  Professor Camp does not marshal any contemporaneous
evidence for this point—aside from noting that the equity hole existed—and it is difficult
to see why Congress would have deleted the phrase “in equity or otherwise” from the text
of the Amendment if it had this purpose in view.  Camp also fails to recognize that Con-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 18  8-DEC-14 14:35
98 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
almost always resided in the same state as the taxpayer, tax challenges nor-
mally were litigated in the state courts—with the possibility of Supreme Court
review under section 25 of the Judiciary Act.
Subsequent statutory history does not support a jurisdictional AIA
either.  The caselaw has never supported a jurisdictional reading of the AIA,
thus Congress could not have affirmed such a reading.118  Moreover, in
amending the statute to clarify various exceptions, Congress never focused
on the jurisdictional question.119  Thus, even if the Court’s decisions could
be read for a jurisdictional AIA, the Supreme Court is unlikely to give weight
to subsequent legislative history where, as here, Congress did not specifically
consider the issue.120
Similar Statutes. There are no similar statutes that suggest the AIA is
jurisdictional.  During the healthcare litigation, the government argued that
the jurisdictional nature of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) meant that the AIA
was jurisdictional.121  But the TIA, while modeled on the AIA,122 is different
in critical ways.  Most importantly, the text of the TIA is plainly directed to
the power of the federal district courts, providing: “The district courts shall not
gress had removed most federal jurisdiction over tax cases in 1866.  § 68, 14 Stat. at 172.
The later treatise cited by Professor Camp does not establish that the AIA was intended to
circumscribe equitable jurisdiction, but instead admits that injunctions might be granted
“when sufficient ground for equitable relief was shown.” See ROGER FOSTER & EVERETT V.
ABBOT, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 18 94, § 72, at 233
(1895). Professor Camp fails to recognize the nature of equity jurisdiction—which allowed
the Court to adjudicate tax lawsuits in certain circumstances. In this vein, even if the his-
tory is ambiguous, the federal courts quickly and decisively interpreted the AIA to permit
federal lawsuits in cases where equity would permit. As Camp notes, Congress was not shy
about reversing court decisions interpreting the federal tax laws, but remained silent with
respect to the AIA.  Camp, supra note 11, at 1337.
118 See infra subsection III.C.1.
119 Congress amended the statutes at various times to provide for various exceptions to
the statutes. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (noting the added language and inserted ref-
erences to various code sections in subsection (a)).  And, in 1966, when Congress
amended the AIA, inserting the phrase “by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed,” id., this merely clarified that the third-party
cause of action granted by the newly enacted Federal Tax Lien Act was exclusive: third-
party filers were subject to the AIA.  South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 377 (1984)
(citing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 731 n.6 (1974)).  In doing so, Congress said
nothing one way or the other about whether the AIA was jurisdictional, and indeed, the
wording of the amendment suggests that Congress viewed the AIA as a condition on liti-
gants, not courts.
120 See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 69. When the Court finds meaning in congressional
inaction, as it would have to do in inferring that Congress meant to codify the Court’s AIA
decisions, it usually “points to specific legislative consideration of the issue and, either
implicitly or explicitly, indicates that Congress’ failure to act bespeaks a probable intent to
reject the alternative(s).” Id.
121 Brief for Petitioners at 13–15, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
122 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 102 (2004) (“In composing the [Tax Injunction Act’s]
text, Congress drew particularly on . . . the Anti-Injunction Act.”); Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,
527 U.S. 423, 434 (1999) (“The federal statute Congress had in plain view was” the AIA).
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enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State.”123  Further, federalism concerns animate the TIA, which
according to its legislative history, was designed expressly to restrict “the juris-
diction of the district courts of the United States over suits relating to the
collection of State taxes.”124  The TIA, unlike the AIA, is located in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341—the section of the United States Code that provides for the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts.  And as the Supreme Court explained with respect
to these very statutes, when Congress clearly addresses a subject in the TIA,
but not in the AIA, that “indicates” that if Congress had desired the AIA to
have the same effect “it would have said so explicitly.”125  Congress’s “failure
to do so” means the two statutes operate differently.126
During the Affordable Care Act litigation, the government also relied
upon 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)—the statute the AIA originally amended in
1867.127  The government argued that, because the AIA “works in tandem”
with § 7422(a), and “uses materially identical language,”128 the Court’s con-
clusion that the preconditions to suit contained in § 7422(a) are jurisdic-
tional means that the AIA is too.129
The government’s reliance on § 7422(a) is a stretch, however.  As the
state litigants pointed out, § 7422(a) was not the deciding factor in any of the
cases cited by the government.130  In each case, the taxpayer had complied
with § 7422(a)’s refund requirement but failed to timely file under a differ-
ent statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a).131  Thus any loose characterization of
§ 7422(a) as jurisdictional would not be entitled to precedential weight.132
Further, the exhaustion requirement contained in § 7422(a), like the AIA,
123 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the original wording of the Act
provided “no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any [state] tax.”  Tax Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 75-
332, § 1, 50 Stat. 738, 738 (1937).  The statute was reworded in 1948, without affecting its
substance. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2335 n.10 (2010) (stating
that the courts have continued to regard the statute as jurisdictional after the rewording).
124 S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 1 (1937).
125 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
126 Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (noting that “unambigu-
ous jurisdictional terms” in a related statute are evidence that Congress “would have spo-
ken in clearer terms if it intended [the statute] to have similar jurisdictional force”).
127 Brief for Petitioners at 13–15, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
128 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (“No suit . . . shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any . . . tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Secretary . . . .”).
129 See Brief for Petitioners at 13–15, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
130 Reply Brief for State Respondents at 5, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
131 Id. (citing United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349 (1997); Comm’r v. Lundy,
516 U.S. 235, 243 (1996); United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 600 (1990)).
132 See id. (“This Court’s references to the status of section 6511(a)’s filing deadline
shed absolutely no light on the AIA.”).
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appears to operate as a quintessential claims-processing rule: it “seek[s] to
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take
certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”133  In short, there is no
similar statute that indicates that the 39th Congress intended for the AIA to
be jurisdictional.
Precedent.  Under the conventional view, scholars, jurists, and litigators
assert that—even if the text and structure of the AIA do not clearly indicate
that Congress intended the AIA to operate jurisdictionally—the AIA is juris-
dictional because a long line of Supreme Court cases support a jurisdictional
reading.134  This view, however, is based on a cursory and incomplete assess-
ment of the caselaw.  Indeed, as most everyone admits, the Supreme Court
has at times viewed the AIA as something less than a jurisdictional bar.135
The Supreme Court’s meandering caselaw is inconsistent with a jurisdic-
tional reading of the AIA in three ways.  First, the Supreme Court’s early
interpretation of the AIA as an equitable statute, culminating in its decision
in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida,136 cannot be reconciled with
a traditionally jurisdictional reading.  Second, two judicially created excep-
tions to the AIA are well-established: the Supreme Court has long held that
the AIA does not apply in “extraordinary circumstances” nor does it when the
party challenging a tax statute has no alternative remedy at law.  Finally, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly accepted the government’s waiver of the AIA
defense, and proceeded to the merits—actions illegitimate under a jurisdic-
tional reading of the AIA.
133 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011); see also Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010) (treating “threshold requirements” as
nonjurisdictional).  As for the Court’s references to § 6511(a)’s filing deadline as being
jurisdictional, there are no substantive or textual similarities between that statute and the
AIA, and the Court has made clear that filing deadlines are of a different stripe altogether.
See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) (“Although several of our recent decisions
have undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdic-
tional rules, none of them calls into question our longstanding treatment of statutory time
limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional.”).  As for the point that § 7422(a) and the AIA
operate “in tandem,” it is not unusual for different aspects of a remedial scheme to carry
different jurisdictional consequences. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 664–65
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (considering some, but not all, certificate of appealability
requirements jurisdictional).
134 Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 10, NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (No. 11-398) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749 (1974); Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962)); see also Brief for Petitioners at
3–5, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (“This Court has repeatedly described the AIA as
jurisdictional in nature and it has held that other, related provisions also rank as jurisdic-
tional.”); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 26–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing) (“Since the Anti–Injunction Act’s enactment in 1867, the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that the Act is jurisdictional.”), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566.
135 Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 7, NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (No. 11-398) (describing “a cyclical pattern” of allegiances to and departures from
the “plain meaning” of the act (quoting Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 745)).
136 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
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1. Standard Nut
Standard Nut is problematic to a jurisdictional reading.  In that case, the
IRS assessed a ten-cent per pound back tax on Southern Nut Product, a vege-
table-based spread, under the Oleomargarine Act of 1886.137  Prior to the
assessment, three federal courts had held similar products nontaxable, and,
by letter ruling, the IRS had informed Standard Nut that Southern Nut Prod-
uct was not subject to the tax.138  Standard Nut then marketed its product at
a three-cent per pound profit.139  After the IRS reversed course, Standard
Nut filed suit to enjoin the ten-cent back tax alleging that it “would destroy
[Standard Nut’s] business, ruin it financially and inflict loss for which it
would have no remedy at law.”140
The Supreme Court upheld a pre-enforcement injunction restraining
collection of the ten-cent tax.  The AIA did not apply because of “special and
extraordinary facts and circumstances.”141  The AIA, the Supreme Court rea-
soned, was merely “declaratory of the principle” that equity usually, but not
always, disallows tax injunction suits.142  As a result, “extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances”—though not mentioned in the text of the AIA—
“render[ed] its provisions inapplicable.”143  And while the Court previously
had given effect to the AIA, it had “never held the rule to be absolute, but
ha[d] repeatedly indicated that extraordinary and exceptional circumstances
render its provisions inapplicable.”144
The standard trope is to view Standard Nut as an aberration.  Courts and
recent commentators first point to an early period of “literal” interpretation
of the AIA, a period of time in which courts purportedly construed the AIA
to be jurisdictional.145  The 1937 decision in Standard Nut is then viewed as a
“judicial departure” from the “plain meaning” of the AIA, followed by a
return to the “plain meaning” in Williams Packing.146
But Standard Nut is not an erratic departure from prior caselaw.  Many of
the very first federal courts to address the AIA, and the Supreme Court’s first
cases involving that statute, endorsed equitable exceptions.147  Indeed, early
federal courts read the AIA in light of the equitable rules that governed tax
injunctions suits before the AIA and construed the AIA in harmony with pre-
137 Id. at 502.
138 Id. at 510.
139 Id. at 505.
140 Id. at 510–11.
141 Id. at 511.
142 Id. at 509.
143 Id. at 510.
144 Id. at 510–11 (citing Graham v. Du Pont, 262 U.S. 234, 257 (1923); Hill v. Wallace,
259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922); Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 122, 126 (1916); Dodge v. Osborn, 240
U.S. 118, 121 (1916); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1916)).
145 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 742 (1974).
146 Id. (“[Williams Packing] spells an end to a cyclical pattern of allegiance to the plain
meaning of the Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from
that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court’s rediscovery of the Act’s purpose.”).
147 See cases cited infra notes 246–47.
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existing equitable exceptions.148  These cases pre-date the Standard Nut deci-
sion and put to rest the argument that the early Supreme Court interpreted
the AIA as a jurisdictional statute.  Indeed, one commentator summed up his
recitation of the first sixty years of (pre-Standard Nut) caselaw with the con-
clusion that “it would appear that [the AIA] may not be read literally.”149
Another commentator summarizing the early caselaw similarly concluded
that the AIA “prohibits the granting of an injunction restraining the collec-
tion of federal taxes unless its provisions are rendered inapplicable to a par-
ticular case because of extraordinary and exceptional circumstances.”150  In
short, as the Supreme Court explained in Standard Nut, while the early
Supreme Court gave effect to the AIA in a number of cases, “[i]t ha[d] never
held the rule to be absolute”151—as would be true of a jurisdictional statute.
2. Equitable Exceptions
Early caselaw permitting federal courts to entertain suits to restrain the
assessment or collection of taxes in some circumstances has culminated in
two well-established judicial exceptions to the AIA.  The Supreme Court has
long taken the view that the Act does not always apply to cases seemingly
within its terms.  It has consistently held that the AIA does not apply in cer-
tain “extraordinary circumstances” and is also inapplicable when the taxpayer
has no alternative remedy at law.  These equitable exceptions are irreconcila-
ble with the view of the AIA as a jurisdictional statute.
The “Extraordinary Circumstances” Exception.  In a series of cases, the Court
held that the AIA “does not prevent an injunction in a case apparently within
its terms in which some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstances
make its provisions inapplicable.”152
While the Supreme Court’s most recent AIA decisions take a cramped
view of what constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, they continue this
148 See cases cited infra notes 246–47.
149 Joseph L. Lewinson, Restraining the Assessment or Collection of a Federal Tax, 14 CALIF.
L. REV. 461, 462 (1926).
150 Clarence A. Miller, Restraining the Collection of Federal Taxes and Penalties by Injunction,
71 U. PA. L. REV. 318, 339 (1923); see also John C. Gall, Enjoining the United States, 10 VA. L.
REV. 194, 194 (1923) (noting that despite the fact that the text of the AIA does not “make
any provision whatever for unusual cases which may arise . . . upon an examination of the
decided cases we find that a great number of suits of this character have been entertained
in the federal courts”); Comment, Taxation—Right of Federal Taxpayer to Question Validity of a
Federal Tax—Effect of Section 3224 of the United States Revised Statutes, 34 MICH. L. REV. 716,
718 (1936) (“Since the machinery of government cannot operate unless taxes are promptly
available, the Supreme Court decided quite early that under ordinary circumstances the
federal courts will not interfere with the collection of taxes by injunction.”).
151 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1932).
152 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922); see also Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20
(1922) (“There must be some extraordinary and exceptional circumstance . . . to make the
provisions of the section inapplicable.”); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916) (“[I]t
is obvious that the statute plainly forbids the enjoining of a tax unless by some extraordi-
nary and entirely exceptional circumstance its provisions are not applicable.”).
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tradition.  In 1962, Williams Packing reaffirmed an equitable exception to the
AIA.  In that case, the district court relied on prior Supreme Court precedent
to enjoin a tax on the extraordinary-circumstances ground that “collection
would destroy [the taxpayer’s] business.”153  The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the AIA could not be avoided “merely because collection would
cause an irreparable injury, such as the ruination of the taxpayer’s enter-
prise.”154  The Court did not, however, question the legitimacy of equitable
exceptions writ large, as one would expect for a truly jurisdictional statute.
Instead, in an odd twist, the Court switched the focus from irreparable harm
to likelihood of success on the merits.155  “[I]f it is clear that under no cir-
cumstances could the government ultimately prevail,” the Court wrote, “the
attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise
exists.”156  The Court then examined the merits of the taxpayer’s claim
(hardly a jurisdictional sort of inquiry) and concluded that the case must be
dismissed because “[t]he record before us clearly reveals that the Govern-
ment’s claim of liability was not without foundation.”157
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue in Bob
Jones University v. Simon is also inconsistent with a jurisdictional reading of the
AIA because it endorses the Williams Packing exception.158 Bob Jones involved
a challenge to the IRS’s revocation of Bob Jones’s tax-exempt status.159  The
Supreme Court first held that the action was a suit “for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” within the terms of the
AIA.160  But that was not the end of the matter.  The Court went on to
describe a two-factor exception to the “literal terms of § 7421 (a): first, irrep-
arable injury . . . and second, certainty of success on the merits.”161  Because
the merits of Bob Jones University’s claims were “debatable,” the equitable
exception to the AIA did not apply.162
The No Alternative Remedy at Law Exception.  From its earliest days, the AIA
has also been interpreted to permit a taxpayer without an adequate remedy
at law to enjoin a tax.  The Supreme Court, for example, routinely permitted
shareholders to challenge corporate taxes notwithstanding the AIA on
grounds the shareholders had no adequate remedy at law once the tax was
153 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 2 (1962) (citing Williams
Packing & Navigation Co. v. Enochs, 176 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959)).
154 Id. at 6.
155 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 745 (1974) (describing the switch “from a
showing of the degree of harm to the plaintiff . . . to the requirement that it be established
that the Service’s action is plainly without a legal basis”).
156 Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7.  In such a situation the exaction is merely in “the
guise of a tax.”  Id. (quoting Standard Nut, 284 U.S. at 509) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
157 Id. at 8.
158 Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 737.
159 Id. at 725.
160 Id. at 738.
161 Id. at 737 (citing Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 6–7).
162 Id. at 749 (citing Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7).
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paid.163  And in a 1938 case, Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgia, the
Supreme Court held the AIA “inapplicable” to a third-party tax challenge.164
In that case, the IRS levied a penalty on the University of Georgia for failure
to collect a tax on athletic events.165  Since the University did not bear the
incidence of the tax, it had no way to challenge the tax penalty, and the
Supreme Court found that the AIA did not bar the suit.166
The more recent decision in South Carolina v. Regan reaffirmed a narrow
remedy at law exception, and is inconsistent with a jurisdictional interpreta-
tion of the AIA.167  In Regan, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality
of “a tax on the interest earned on state obligations issued in bearer
form.”168  The government argued that “a plaintiff may only sue to restrain
the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to the Act enunci-
ated in Williams Packing.”169  The Court disagreed, concluding that, since the
AIA was an amendment to a remedial statute providing for administrative
review, the “circumstances of [the AIA’s] enactment strongly suggest that
Congress intended the Act to bar a suit only in situations in which Congress
had provided the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to
contest the legality of a particular tax.”170  Since South Carolina was “unable
to utilize any statutory procedure” to challenge the bond tax, the AIA did not
prevent the issuance of an injunction.171
The Court’s recent and repeated affirmation of some stripe of the
“extraordinary and exceptional circumstances” test, and its conclusion that
the AIA does not apply where Congress has not provided an alternate legal
avenue, are difficult to reconcile with a jurisdictional bar.  As the Supreme
Court explained long ago, a jurisdictional limit admits of no court-created
equitable exception, even if a meritorious litigant is left wholly without rem-
edy.172  Because the Court’s “power to hear and determine a case” is con-
ferred by Congress, Congress alone may determine “the manner in which the
163 Graham v. Du Pont, 262 U.S. 234, 257–58 (1923); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240
U.S. 1, 26 (1916); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 554 (1895), reh’g
granted and opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
164 Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 449 (1938).
165 Id. at 441–44.
166 Id. at 449.
167 South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1984).
168 Id. at 372.
169 Id. at 374.
170 Id. at 373.
171 Id. at 380.
172 United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848); see also Dolan v. United
States, 560 U.S. 605, 609 (2010) (stating that, if a statute imposes a jurisdiction limit, then
that limit is absolute); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (stating that, if a statute
imposes a jurisdiction limit, then that limit is absolute); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514–16 (2006) (stating that, if a statute imposes a jurisdiction limit, then that limit is
absolute); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (stating that the statute at issue was
nonjurisdictional and the Court could, therefore, make an exception to it).
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case shall be brought,” and the Court “ha[s] no power to dispense with any of
these provisions, nor to change or modify them.”173
During the Affordable Care Act litigation, the government argued that
the Williams Packing and Regan exceptions were “a product of statutory inter-
pretation, rooted in the AIA’s text and purpose.”174  Judge Kavanaugh
agrees, writing that Williams Packing and Regan stand for the unremarkable
proposition that “the status of a statute as jurisdictional does not disable the
courts from interpreting the statute and Congress’s intent by means of the
usual tools of statutory construction.”175  Yet the usual tools of statutory con-
struction do not yield a conditional AIA.  Neither the text nor its structure
says anything about extraordinary circumstances in which the government
puts on a bad case, or where the aggrieved party has no alternate remedy at
law.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself referred to the former exception
as a “judicially created” exclusion.176
3. Waiver
In several cases, the government has taken the position that it may waive
an AIA defense, and the Court has proceeded on the merits—facts inconsis-
tent with a jurisdictional AIA.  Most notably, in Helvering v. Davis, the govern-
ment explained its view that the AIA “may be waived by an appropriate
officer of the United States.”177  In that case, a shareholder challenged the
withholding provisions of the Social Security Act.178  The First Circuit
declared that payroll taxes violated the Tenth Amendment, and the govern-
ment sought review by the Supreme Court.179  Before the Court, the govern-
ment argued that the Supreme Court “should render a decision on the
merits” because “waiver [of the AIA] is certainly within the power of the
appropriate officers of the Government.”180  Since parties may not waive a
173 Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 113.
174 Brief for Petitioners at 16, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); see also Seven-
Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 29–34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (going
through the usual tools of statutory interpretation in order to see if the AIA applies), abro-
gated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
175 Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 29 n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
176 Regan, 465 U.S. at 372.  The government also defended the equitable exception by
arguing that in cases in which it is clear that the government cannot ultimately prevail, “the
central purpose of the Act is inapplicable” and “the exaction is merely in the guise of a
tax.”  Brief for Petitioners at 3–5, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (quoting Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  But a broad resort to purpose does not allow the Court to create equitable excep-
tions to jurisdictional requirements.  Further, the Court has long held that allegations of
illegality are insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the AIA. See, e.g., Snyder v. Marks,
109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883).
177 Brief for Petitioners at 31, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (No. 36-910).
178 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 637.
179 Id. at 638.
180 Brief for Petitioners at 28–31, Helvering, 301 U.S. 619 (No. 36-910).
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jurisdictional impediment,181 the government’s argument, and the Court’s
decision on the merits, is evidence that the AIA is not jurisdictional.
Even the opinion in dissent suggests that the AIA is not jurisdictional.
The four dissenting justices were concerned with their power to issue an equi-
table remedy, not with jurisdiction as such.182  The Court previously had
allowed shareholders to challenge the assessment of a corporate tax because,
once a tax voluntarily was paid, no refund could be issued, and the share-
holders were without remedy.183  Congress subsequently granted sharehold-
ers statutory authority to compel a corporation to seek a refund for taxes,
even though voluntarily paid.184  In light of this new remedy, Justice Cardozo
argued on behalf of the four dissenting justices that the Court should not
hear the case because the shareholders did not meet the criteria for equity
jurisdiction.185  A majority of the Court, however, disagreed finding “in this
case extraordinary features making it fitting . . . to determine whether the
benefits and the taxes are valid or invalid.”186
In Seven-Sky v. Holder, Judge Kavanaugh distinguished Helvering as a case
between shareholders and a corporation, not the government.187  But that
fact should make no difference.  The AIA does not refer to suits against the
government.  As the government put it in Helvering: “We agree that [the AIA]
is intended to prevent equitable interference with the collection of Federal
taxes by all devices, including the medium of a stockholder’s suit in equity
against a corporation to enjoin payment.”188  And as Justice Cardozo noted,
shareholders were no longer unique; like other taxpayers, they too could
avail themselves of a remedy at law.189
The Supreme Court, moreover, has accepted the government’s waiver in
other pre-enforcement challenges to federal taxes.  In Sunshine Anthracite, the
plaintiff brought suit “praying for a temporary injunction suspending and
restraining the assessing and collecting or attempting to assess and collect”
181 Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 216 (2007).  Federal courts “must raise and decide
jurisdictional questions” on their own, even where the parties agree that there is no juris-
dictional impediment to review.  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197,
1202 (2011).
182 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639–40.
183 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1916); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 554 (1895), reh’g granted and opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
184 With the passage of section 1014 of the Revenue Act of 1924, shareholders could
bring actions to recover unlawful taxes whether or not the corporation had paid volunta-
rily. See Norman v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 89 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1937).  As a result,
shareholders could no longer allege irreparable harm when a corporation voluntarily paid
an allegedly illegal tax. See id.
185 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639–40.
186 Id. at 640.
187 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting),
abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
188 Brief for Petitioners at 31, Helvering, 301 U.S. 619 (No. 36-910).
189 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639.
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two taxes imposed by the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.190  Even though the
prayer for relief sought a remedy barred by the very terms of the AIA, the
government “expressly waived” reliance on the AIA, and the Court decided
the case on the merits.191  In yet a third case, Pollock, the government again
“explicitly waived” any question as to the AIA during oral argument and the
Court rendered a decision on the merits.192
Jurisdictional statutes are strict limits on a court’s adjudicatory power.
The Court’s equity-based decision in Standard Nut, its longstanding endorse-
ment of two equitable exceptions, and its three-time acceptance of the gov-
ernment’s waiver of the AIA collectively extinguish the conventional wisdom
of a jurisdictional AIA.
4. Oft-Relied Upon Precedent
Precedent is irreconcilable with the notion that the Supreme Court has
long considered the AIA to be a jurisdictional statute.  What then of the sup-
posed “long line” of uniform precedent holding the AIA jurisdictional?193  It
turns out to be difficult to pinpoint even a single case which clearly holds that
the AIA is jurisdictional.
Three early cases—Snyder v. Marks,194 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co.,195 and Hornthall v. Collector196—are often cited as proof that the early
Supreme Court viewed the AIA as jurisdictional.197
Snyder comes the closest.  In that case, the taxpayer argued that the AIA
did not apply to an allegedly “illegal tax.”198  The government asserted that
the AIA barred the suit and that the Supreme Court lacked equitable jurisdic-
tion.199  The Court held that the AIA applied “to all assessments of taxes,
made under color of their offices, by internal revenue officers charged with
190 Statement as to Jurisdiction at 11, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 (1940) (No. 804).
191 Brief for the Appellee at 9, Sunshine, 310 U.S. 381 (No. 804).
192 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 554 (1895), reh’g granted and
opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
193 See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 10, NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); see also Brief for Petitioners at 5–6, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(No. 11-398) (“This court has repeatedly described the AIA as jurisdictional in
nature . . . .”); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 26–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court has consistently treated the AIA as a jurisdictional
requirement), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
194 109 U.S. 189 (1883).
195 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
196 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 560 (1869).
197 See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 16, NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (citing all three cases in support of belief that AIA is jurisdictional);
see also Brief for Petitioners at 10, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (citing only Snyder in
support).
198 Snyder, 109 U.S. at 192.
199 Id. at 191.
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general jurisdiction.”200  And since Congress had provided an alternative and
exclusive refund remedy, a suit to restrain collection of the tax was forbidden
under the AIA.201
The Snyder Court’s reliance on the AIA as grounds for its dismissal is
inconclusive.  The case did not use the jurisdictional label and is consistent
with the view that the AIA imposes a mandatory (but not jurisdictional)
requirement and also with the view that the AIA simply codified traditional
equitable rules.  Since the government raised and pressed the AIA defense,
the Snyder Court was not confronted with the question whether the AIA was
truly jurisdictional, i.e., whether it always barred suit, or rather whether it was
a mandatory condition that might be waived or forfeited.  Further, equity
jurisdiction plainly was absent because Congress had provided an adequate
alternative remedy.  In view of other cases decided near the same time, early
commentators and litigants argued that the Snyder dismissal was best
explained on equitable grounds.202
Brushaber also falls short.203  In Brushaber, the Supreme Court “put out of
the way a question of jurisdiction” and held that shareholders could chal-
lenge the voluntary payment of a corporate tax notwithstanding the AIA
where they alleged the “absence of all means of redress.”204  To permit such
a suit “did not violate the prohibitions of [the AIA], against enjoining the
enforcement of taxes.”205  Indeed, any jurisdictional argument to the con-
trary was “without merit.”206
As for Hornthall, the case is, by definition, a drive-by jurisdictional rul-
ing.207  In Hornthall, the government argued that the Court should dismiss
for two reasons: “(1) Because the parties to the suit are citizens of the same
State,” and “(2) [b]ecause the Circuit Court has no power to afford a remedy
by injunction for such a grievance.”208  The government’s latter argument
could just as easily have referred to the general equitable rule that a federal
court will not enjoin a tax as to the AIA.  But even if the second point refers
to the AIA, the Court did not spend much time on that issue: “[I]t will not be
necessary to examine the second proposition with much particularity, as the
first is clearly correct and must prevail.”209  While Hornthall noted the exis-
tence of the AIA, any application of the statute was unnecessary as diversity
jurisdiction did not exist.210
200 Id. at 193.
201 Id. at 193–94.
202 See Brief on Behalf of Appellees at 21, Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922) (No.
590).
203 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
204 Id. at 10.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 560 (1869).
208 Id. at 564.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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On occasion, other early cases are offered as evidence of a long line of
Supreme Court precedent holding the AIA to be jurisdictional.  In Bob Jones
University v. Simon, for example, the Supreme Court offered up a handful of
cases from the first half century of the AIA’s existence as evidence that the
Court previously had given the AIA “literal force.”211  Yet when one considers
those five cases, no conclusion of jurisdictional import may be drawn.  The
first two cases, the State Railroad Tax Cases212 and Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v.
United States,213 are state tax cases to which the AIA does not apply; they are,
at most, “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”214  More importantly, both of those
cases advance a view of the AIA as governing the equity jurisdiction of the
federal courts, not jurisdiction per se.215  As discussed above, Snyder is fully
consistent with either a mandatory or an equitable reading of the AIA.216
The last two cases, Dodge v. Osborn and Bailey v. George, are inconsistent with
the conclusion that the AIA is a jurisdictional statute because they bless equi-
table exceptions.217  With the possible exception of Snyder, then, no early
case supports a long line of Supreme Court precedent and practice holding
the AIA to be jurisdictional.
More recent cases said to support a jurisdictional reading of the AIA fare
no better.  Two cases in particular, Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co.218 and Bob Jones University v. Simon,219 are often cited for the proposition
that the Supreme Court has held the AIA to be jurisdictional.  In contrast to
the older decisions discussed above, those cases do refer to the AIA as juris-
dictional.  In Williams Packing, the Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he object of
§ 7421 (a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to
entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal
taxes.”220  And in Bob Jones University, the Court concluded that “the Court of
Appeals did not err in holding that § 7421 (a) deprived the District Court of
jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief petitioner sought.”221  But these two
cases were decided during the height of the Supreme Court’s overinclusive
use of the term jurisdiction.  As the Court’s recent jurisdictional cases teach,
211 416 U.S. 725, 742 (1974) (“During the first half century of the Act’s existence, the
Court gave it literal force, without regard to the character of the tax, the nature of the pre-
enforcement challenge to it, or the status of the plaintiff.”); see also Seven-Sky v. Holder,
661 F.3d 1, 26–27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (listing a line of cases that
treat the AIA as jurisdictional), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
212 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
213 187 U.S. 447 (1903).
214 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215 See Pac. Steam Whaling, 187 U.S. at 452; State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613–14.
216 See supra note 176.
217 Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 121–22
(1916).
218 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
219 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
220 Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 5.
221 Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 749.
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loose use of the term jurisdiction is not precedential.222  The substance of
the two cases—specifically, their recognition of an equitable exception—
makes clear that Williams Packing and Bob Jones University do not support a
jurisdictional AIA.223
In sum, neither the text nor the structure nor the history of the AIA
indicates that the statute is jurisdictional.  As for the oft-relied upon “long
line” of precedent, that precedent points in the opposite direction—allowing
waiver and equitable exceptions—demonstrating that the AIA cannot possi-
bly be jurisdictional.
If the AIA is not a jurisdictional statute, what is it?  This question is of
critical importance to the exercise of Congress’s taxing power and to the
ability of taxpayers to challenge such exercises.  The next Part will argue that
the AIA governs the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.
IV. THE EQUITABLE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 is not
a jurisdictional statute: it is an equitable one.  A close analysis of the Supreme
Court’s AIA jurisprudence reveals a surprisingly consistent line of cases inter-
preting the AIA in harmony with the equitable jurisdiction of the federal
courts.  The AIA was enacted during the height of the canon that statutes in
derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly, and the courts
first tasked with interpreting the AIA applied a similar canon to equity: they
read the statute in light of the rule that equity ordinarily will not enjoin a tax.
This equitable rule explains the Supreme Court’s seemingly meandering
222 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (finding the indication
requirement of a certificate of appeal nonjurisidctional because Congress had not been
clear); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (stating that the Court
has previously mischaracterized claim-processing rules for jurisdictional limitations);
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (describing past cases as being “less than
meticulous” in using the term, jurisdiction, and that those cases do not hold precedential
value).
223 Because Congress is the ultimate arbiter of federal jurisdiction, federal courts have
no authority to craft equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.  Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2004); Bowles v. Russel, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the court must dismiss the action.”).  The government also cited Alexander v. Ameri-
cans United Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 757–58 (1974), as a recent case holding the AIA
jurisdictional, in the Affordable Care Act litigation, Brief for Petitioners, NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), but that case reaffirms the Court’s adherence to the equitable
test announced in Williams Packing.  Amicus Robert Long cited Jefferson County v. Acker, 527
U.S. 423, 434 (1999), which expressly refers to the AIA as “jurisdictional.”  Brief for
Court–Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 11, 39, 48, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(No. 11-398).  But that case is inapposite because it involved the 1937 Tax Injunction Act,
not the AIA. Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 433. Notably, the Court referred to the AIA to
find that certain suits were permissible despite the TIA. Id. at 434–35.  The Court held that,
like the AIA, the TIA should be construed so as not to bar collection actions undertaken by
the government and must not prevent taxpayers from asserting a defense that the tax was
invalid in such suits. Id.
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jurisprudence—the repeated acceptance of the government’s waiver of the
AIA, its endorsement of general equitable exceptions, and Standard Nut’s
conclusion that the AIA is merely declaratory of general equitable principles.
That the AIA governs equity jurisdiction is of considerable practical
importance.  The consequences that attach to jurisdictional statutes are dra-
matically different from those that attach to statutes that govern equity juris-
diction.  Because the AIA addresses equity, the jurisdictional bar is not
absolute.  Because equity jurisdiction does not govern the very authority of
the court to hear the case, it may be waived or forfeited.  And because equity
jurisdiction exists when the remedy at law is inadequate, federal courts may
hear tax injunction suits in extraordinary circumstances notwithstanding the
AIA.224
The equitable rules that governed tax suits prior to the AIA and the
caselaw that applied those same rules to suits after the AIA’s enactment
reveal a consistent set of circumstances in which strict compliance with the
AIA is not required.  This Part will identify those circumstances and sketch
out how they might apply to present-day tax litigation.
A. Equity and Taxes
Equity never has had much to do with taxes.  Because the government
depends upon the prompt collection of tax revenues, and because the public
has every reason to delay and dispute taxation, the First Congress, and every
Congress since, has enforced taxes “by summary and stringent means.”225
Instead of ordinary judicial review,226 taxpayers are provided an administra-
224 When a tax regulation is at issue, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
for judicial review of agency action.  But that review is available only so long as Congress
has not provided other judicial review procedures.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing
review for final agency action when “there is no other adequate remedy in a court”); see
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988) (noting that the APA “does not provide
additional judicial remedies in situations where the Congress has provided special and
adequate review procedures” (quoting 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MAN-
UAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 101 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  Sections 7421(a) and 7422(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permit lawsuits for the
recovery of wrongfully collected taxes to go forward, but only after the tax has been paid
and an administrative refund claim has been filed.  26 U.S.C. § 7422(a).  If this procedure
is an adequate remedy at law, then taxpayers must comply before filing suit under the APA.
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  Although the compass of APA
review of agency action is beyond the scope of this Article, the test for whether a tax chal-
lenge may go forward—the adequacy of the legal remedy—is the same under the AIA and
the APA.
225 State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 614 (1875); see also Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S.
78, 80 (1881) (noting that “[t]he necessities of government, the nature of the duty to be
performed, and the customary usages of the people,” mean that a “different procedure” is
necessary for enforcing taxes).
226 Kelly, 104 U.S. at 80.
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tive appeal.  In addition, they may file a refund claim in federal court, but
only after paying the disputed tax.227
This legal remedy meant that tax cases generally were outside the equita-
ble jurisdiction of the federal courts.228  In the routine tax case, the Supreme
Court explained, “the party of whom an illegal tax is collected has ordinarily
ample remedy”229—the plaintiff protesting against its enforcement might
pay the tax and sue to recover back the money, making it difficult “to suggest
any ground of equitable jurisdiction.”230  Because Congress had provided an
alternate remedy, equity jurisdiction did not obtain in the garden-variety tax
dispute.231
Yet there was no absolute limitation on the powers of a court sitting in
equity to enjoin the collection of an illegal tax.232  Equitable relief was availa-
ble in “special circumstances”: where the remedy at law was inadequate and
where the case fell “under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction.”233
B. Equity and the AIA
The federal courts’ familiarity with equity rules and expansion of the
derogation canon to equity explains early interpretations of the AIA.  At the
time of the AIA’s enactment in 1867, courts were well aware of “the federal
rule that a suit in equity will not lie to restrain collection on the sole ground
that the tax is illegal.”234  They were also familiar with the exception to that
rule: a suit could be maintained where, in addition to illegality, the plaintiff
alleged “special and extraordinary circumstances sufficient to bring the case
within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence.”235  In short, the
AIA “was written against the background of general equitable principles dis-
favoring the issuance of federal injunctions against taxes, absent clear proof
that available remedies at law were inadequate.”236
227 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
228 State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. at 613.
229 Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591, 594 (1891).
230 Id. at 595 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231 See COOLEY, supra note 116, at 536; see also Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 547, 548 (1872) (“It has been the settled law of the country for a great many years,
that an injunction bill to restrain the collection of a tax, on the sole ground of the illegality
of the tax, cannot be maintained.”).
232 Shelton, 139 U.S. at 594–95.
233 Id. (quoting COOLEY, supra note 116, at 536; Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 108, 109–10 (1870)).
234 California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 262 (1938) (footnote omitted).
235 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 499 (1932) (citing State R.R.
Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875); Hannewinkle, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 547; Dows, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) at 108).
236 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 742 n.16 (1974) (citing Pittsburgh Ry. v. Bd.
of Pub. Works, 172 U.S. 32 (1898); Shelton, 139 U.S. at 591; Dows, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at
109–10); see also State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. at 613–14 (citing Hannewinkle, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 547; Dows, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108; Dodd v. City of Hartford, 25 Conn. 232 (1856);
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Much maligned in recent times, the canon that statutes in derogation of
the common law be narrowly construed came of age in the mid-1800s.237
Substantively, the derogation canon required courts to construe statutes in
harmony with previously existing common law, absent a plainly contrary stat-
utory purpose.  As the Supreme Court explained as early as 1797, an act
“being in derogation of the common law, is to be taken strictly.”238  By the
mid-1800s, the federal courts assumed that Congress legislated with an expec-
tation that the common law principle would apply.239  Thus the Supreme
Court of the late 1800s taught that “[n]o statute is to be construed as altering
the common law, farther than its words import.  It is not to be construed as
making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly
express.”240  Practically speaking, Harvard Dean Roscoe Pound explained (as
a criticism), the canon meant that statutes were construed so as “to interfere
with the status quo as little as possible.”241
Though the derogation canon has since suffered much abuse, it was not
only the federal courts, but also the most influential nineteenth-century
scholars, who took a favorable view of the canon.  Justice Story explained the
rule as follows: “In all cases of a doubtful nature, the common law will prevail,
and the statute not be construed to repeal it.”242  In addition to Justice
Story’s account, Chancellor James Kent wrote that statutes were “construed
in reference to the principles of the common law, for it is not to be presumed
that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law,
further than the case absolutely required.”243  Sutherland’s treatise on statu-
Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28 (N.Y. Ch. 1822); Messeck v. Columbia Cnty. Supervi-
sors, 50 Barb. 190 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867)).
237 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 103, at 956 (explaining the traditional rule “that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed” and noting the erosion of
this rule during the twentieth century).
238 Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797).
239 ESKRIDGE, supra note 103, at 956.
240 Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
241 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387 (1908) [here-
inafter Pound, Common Law] (emphasis omitted); see also Warren R. Maichel, Legislation—
The Role of the Common Law in Interpretation of Statutes in Missouri, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 101,
101 (“One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is that all legislation is
to be considered in the light of the common law.”); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7
COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
242 Joseph Story, Law, Legislation, Codes, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 576, 584 (Francis
Lieber ed. & trans., 1831), reprinted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION app. III, at 362 (1971); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 267–71 (John Norton Pomeroy ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 2d ed.
1874) (1756) (“[W]riters like Coke . . . spoke of [the derogation canon] as the perfection
of human wisdom . . . .”).
243 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 464 (New York, O. Halsted, 2d ed.
1832); see also 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW § 88, at 21 (Daniel A. Gleason
ed., Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1870) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed.”).
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tory interpretation was also enthusiastic about the canon, explaining its ratio-
nale: “The common law, which has been moulded into a logical classification
of subject matter provides one of the most reliable backgrounds upon which
an analysis of the purpose and objectives of the statute can be
determined.”244
The federal courts first tasked with interpreting the AIA extended the
derogation canon to equity and construed that statute as subject to the tradi-
tional equitable exceptions.  In the 1870 case of Pullan v. Kinsinger, for exam-
ple, the District of Ohio held that the AIA “was wholly unnecessary, enacted
only as a politic and kindly publication of an old and familiar rule” that an
injunction will not generally lie to prevent the collection of an illegal tax.245
Early courts went on to note that traditional equitable exceptions survived
the AIA,246 and others to enjoin the assessment or collection of a tax, finding
that the AIA “does not prevent an injunction in a case apparently within its
terms in which some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstances
make its provisions inapplicable.”247
244 3 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5301, at 3 (Frank E.
Horack Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1943).
245 20 F. Cas. 44, 48 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (No. 11,463).
246 See, e.g., Huston v. Iowa Soap Co., 85 F.2d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1936) (stating that the
AIA “is not an absolute bar in every case to injunctive relief”); Cohen v. Durning, 11 F.
Supp. 824, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (noting the adequate remedy at law exception); Grosvenor-
Dale Co. v. Bitgood, 12 F. Supp. 416, 417 (D. Conn. 1935) (same); Larabee Flour Mills Co.
v. Nee, 12 F. Supp. 395, 399 (W.D. Mo. 1935) (noting that the AIA “does not prohibit a suit
in equity to restrain the collection of a tax where the tax is illegally exacted and where the
taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law for its recovery if it is paid by him; [and such]
remedy at law must not only be  adequate . . . [but also] clear and unquestioned.”); Rieder
v. Rogan, 12 F. Supp. 307, 320 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (noting the adequate remedy at law excep-
tion); John A. Gebelein, Inc. v. Milbourne, 12 F. Supp. 105, 121 (D. Md. 1935) (enjoining a
tax and finding that the AIA does not apply to novel cases resulting in “exceptional and
unusual hardship” and “irreparable damage”); French Mortg. & Bond Co. v. Woodworth,
38 F.2d 841, 842 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (noting the exceptional circumstances exception);
Lafayette Worsted Co. v. Page, 6 F.2d 399, 400 (D.R.I. 1925) (noting the exceptional cir-
cumstances exception); Acklin v. People’s Sav. Ass’n, 293 F. 392, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1923)
(recognizing the “existence of exceptional cases” which permit review notwithstanding the
AIA); Burgdorf v. District of Columbia, 7 App. D.C. 405, 414 (1896) (noting an exception
for “additional special circumstances, bringing the case under some recognized head of
equity jurisdiction, such as irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or cloud on the title of
the complainant”); Frayser v. Russell, 9 F. Cas. 728, 729 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1878) (No. 5067)
(noting that the challenge does not fall “within the letter, or spirit, or intention” of the AIA
and that the multiplicity of suit exception applies).
247 Trinacia Real Estate Co. v. Clarke, 34 F.2d 325, 328 (N.D.N.Y. 1929) (issuing injunc-
tion); see also Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Page, 81 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1936) (issuing
injunction); Kingan & Co. v. Smith, 16 F. Supp. 549, 552 (S.D. Ind. 1936) (granting injunc-
tion because of inadequate remedy at law); Baltic Mills Co. v. Bitgood, 12 F. Supp. 132, 135
(D. Conn. 1935) (granting injunction because of inadequate remedy at law and multiplic-
ity of suit); Danahy Packing Co. v. McGowan, 11 F. Supp. 920, 924 (W.D.N.Y. 1935) (issuing
injunction); Inland Milling Co. v. Huston, 11 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Iowa 1935) (issuing
injunction); Neild Mfg. Corp. v. Hassett, 11 F. Supp. 642, 642 (D. Mass. 1935) (issuing
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The Supreme Court also narrowly construed the AIA so as to recognize
the same equitable principles that governed tax injunction suits before its
passage.  Just a few years after the AIA was enacted, the State Railroad Tax
Cases Court viewed the AIA as apiece with the traditional equitable rules that
governed suits to restrain taxes.248  After discussing the caselaw, which
demonstrated that equity would not enjoin a tax unless there was no ade-
quate remedy at law, the Court said:
We do not propose to lay down in these cases any absolute limitation of the
powers of a court of equity in restraining the collection of illegal taxes; but
we may say, that, in addition to illegality, hardship, or irregularity, the case
must be brought within some of the recognized foundations of equitable
jurisdiction, and that mere errors or excess in valuation, or hardship or
injustice of the law, or any grievance which can be remedied by a suit at law,
either before or after payment of taxes, will not justify a court of equity to
interpose by injunction to stay collection of a tax.249
Making clear that the Supreme Court was concerned about its equitable
jurisdiction, the Court summarized: “No court of equity will, therefore, allow
its injunction to issue to restrain their action, except where it may be neces-
sary to protect the citizen whose property is taxed, and he has no adequate
remedy by the ordinary processes of the law.”250  Although the railroads sued
to enjoin a state tax, the Supreme Court went on to remark how the AIA was
passed so “there might be no misunderstanding of the universality of” the
principles described above—i.e., that equity disfavors but does not prohibit
tax injunction suits.251
The Court subsequently and repeatedly construed the AIA to recognize
the same equitable exceptions that applied before its enactment.  In discuss-
ing the AIA in 1903, the Pacific Steam Whaling Court equated the AIA with
traditional rules of equity and described the rule as follows: “Something
more than mere illegality is necessary to justify the interference of a court of
equity.”252  The Court went on to consider whether the case fell within any
injunction); Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11 F. Supp. 65, 65 (D. Minn. 1935) (issuing
injunction); Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 20 F.2d 948, 949 (D.R.I. 1927) (granting injunction
and noting that “where there is no adequate remedy at law, the court should have power to
grant relief”).  Other early cases exist in which the federal courts dismissed under the AIA,
but those cases do not indicate that the AIA is jurisdictional.  In those cases, the taxpayers
argued that the AIA did not apply to invalid taxes and the federal courts disagreed.  There
was never any finding that the remedy at law was inadequate. See, e.g., Kensett v. Stivers, 10
F. 517, 522–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) (describing cases); United States v. Pac. R.R., 27 F. Cas. 397,
397 (E.D. Mo. 1877) (No. 15,983); Alkan v. Bean, 1 F. Cas. 418, 420 (E.D. Wisc. 1877) (No.
202).
248 92 U.S. 575, 613 (1875).
249 Id. at 614.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 613.
252 Pac. Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 447, 452 (1903).
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traditional equitable head of jurisdiction: irreparable injury, multiplicity of
suits, and cloud upon real estate title.253
In 1916, Dodge v. Osborn held that the AIA forbid “the enjoining of a tax
unless by some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstance [the
AIA’s] provisions are not applicable.”254  The 1922 case of Bailey v. George
similarly contemplated equitable exceptions: “There must be some extraordi-
nary and exceptional circumstance not here averred or shown to make the
provisions of the section inapplicable.”255
The Court’s early interpretation of the AIA to permit “extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances” was not merely dictum.  In a second case brought
by the Dodge plaintiffs, hereinafter Dodge II, the Court relied upon the excep-
tion to find the AIA inapplicable.  Plaintiffs paid the contested tax and
exhausted their administrative remedies, but failed to allege exhaustion in
their second lawsuit.  Even though jurisdictional prerequisites must be
pleaded and proved by the plaintiff,256 the Court rebuffed the government’s
argument that the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust: “[W]e
think that this [tax] case is so exceptional in character as not to justify us in
holding that reversible error was committed by the court below in passing
upon the case upon its merits.”257  The Supreme Court subsequently under-
stood Dodge II to stand for the proposition that “[the AIA] does not prevent
an injunction in a case apparently within its terms in which some extraordi-
nary and entirely exceptional circumstances make its provisions
inapplicable.”258
Furthermore, in a series of three cases in 1922, the Court held the AIA
inapplicable to tax penalties imposed by the Grain Futures Trading Act, find-
ing that “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances”—criminal penalties
and a multiplicity of suits—made the AIA inapplicable.259  In Hill v. Wallace,
for example, the Court relied upon an equitable exception to permit pre-
enforcement challenges to processing taxes imposed by the Grain Futures
Trading Act.260  Because countless individual suits must be filed, the Court
found the refund remedy to be impractical: “We think these exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances with respect to the operation of [the Grain
Futures Trading Act] make [the AIA] inapplicable.”261  And while the Court
has subsequently narrowed the scope of the tax penalty cases, holding that
253 Id.
254 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916) (emphasis added).
255 Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922).
256 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
257 Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 122, 126 (1916).
258 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922) (citing Brady, 240 U.S. at 126).
259 Id. at 62; see also Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922) (enjoining the
revenue collector from enforcing collection of unlawful taxes and penalties); Lipke v. Led-
erer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (stating that penalties and taxes for alleged violations of the
National Prohibition Act cannot be enforced by distraint of property without notice and an
opportunity to be heard and that the AIA does not preclude injunctive relief).
260 Hill, 259 U.S. at 62.
261 Id.
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the AIA applies to “truly revenue-raising tax statutes,” it has not renounced
the underlying equitable exception.262
The three waiver cases mentioned above also support an equitable read-
ing of the AIA.263  In Helvering v. Davis, for instance, the government argued
that the Supreme Court “should render a decision on the merits” of the
Social Security Act’s payroll taxes because “waiver [of the AIA] is certainly
within the power of the appropriate officers of the Government.”264  This
articulates what amounts to an equitable view of the AIA; because equity juris-
diction does not govern the federal court’s authority to hear a case, the
defense may be waived or forfeited.  The Supreme Court’s decision on the
merits indicates that it too saw the AIA as nonjurisdictional.
Standard Nut is the culmination of the Supreme Court’s AIA qua equity
jurisprudence.  The case upheld a pre-enforcement injunction on grounds
that the AIA did not apply because of “special and extraordinary facts and
circumstances.”265  Speaking in terms of the derogation canon, the Court
held that the AIA was merely “declaratory of the principle” that equity usu-
ally, but not always, disallows tax injunction suits.266  The AIA was to be con-
strued “in harmony with [this rule] and the reasons upon which it rests.”267
Accordingly, the inadequate remedy at law exception was valid—even though
it was not specifically mentioned in the text: “The general words employed
are not sufficient, and it would require specific language undoubtedly dis-
closing that purpose, to warrant the inference that Congress intended to
abrogate that salutary and well established rule.”268  And while the Court pre-
viously had given effect to the AIA, “[i]t ha[d] never held the rule to be
absolute, but ha[d] repeatedly indicated that extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances render its provisions inapplicable.”269
In announcing its rule that the AIA should be interpreted in harmony
with background equitable rules and rationales, the Supreme Court relied
upon cases that endorse the derogation canon.  The Court first looked to
Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kelly, a 1908 derogation canon case
262 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 743 (1974) (citing Graham v. Du Pont, 262
U.S. 234 (1923)).
263 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 554 (1895), reh’g
granted and opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
264 Brief for Petitioners at 28, 31, Helvering, 301 U.S. 619 (No. 910).  The AIA “may be
waived by an appropriate officer of the United States.” Id. at 31; see also Pollock, 157 U.S. at
554 (waiving the question of jurisdiction because an objection of adequate remedy at law
was never raised).
265 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 511 (1932).
266 Id. at 509.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 509–10 (citing Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922); Dodge v. Brady, 240
U.S. 122, 126 (1916); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 121 (1916)); cf. Graham v. Du Pont,
262 U.S. 234, 257 (1923); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
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from the Sixth Circuit.270  In Kelly, the Sixth Circuit found that a Tennessee
statute was merely “declaratory of the common-law duty not to discrimi-
nate.”271  The appellate court held that the statute must be read in light of
the common law and quoted Sutherland’s admonition that “the best con-
struction of a statute is to construe i[t] as near to the rule and reason of the
common law as may be, and by the course which that observes in other
cases.”272
Baker v. Baker, the second case cited by the Supreme Court in Standard
Nut, looks backward to English common law for the canon that statutes in
affirmance of the common law are to be construed by that law.273  In Miles v.
Williams, for example, the English court said: “The best rule of construing
Acts of Parliament is by the common law, and by the course which that
observed in like cases of its own before the Act.”274  And, in Arthur v. Boken-
ham, the Common Pleas said:
The general rule in exposition of all Acts of Parliament is this—that, in all
doubtful matters, and where the expression is in general terms, they are to
receive such a construction as may be agreeable to the rules of the common
law, in cases of that nature; for statutes are not presumed to make any altera-
tion in the common law, further or otherwise than the Act does expressly
declare; therefore, in all general matters, the law presumes the Act did not
intend to make any alteration; for, if the Parliament had had that design,
they would have expressed it in the Act.275
Bradley v. People, a case about cattle rustling in Colorado, also provided
authority for the Court’s use of the derogation canon.276 Bradley cited
English law for the proposition that “ ‘[a] statute general in its terms is con-
strued as subject to any exceptions which the common law requires.’”277
The Standard Nut Court made clear its reliance on, and expansion to
equity of, the derogation canon by citing section 454 of Sutherland’s Rules of
Statutory Construction.  That section of the widely influential treatise states: “It
is not presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon
the common law further than the necessity of the case required.”278  Statutes
in derogation of the common law, the treatise continues, “are strictly con-
270 160 F. 316, 320–21 (6th Cir. 1908).
271 Id. at 320.
272 Id. at 321 (quoting SUTHERLAND, supra note 244, § 290, at 374) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
273 13 Cal. 87, 95 (1859).
274 Id. (citing Miles v. Williams, 88 Eng. Rep. 711 (Q.B. 1714)).
275 Id. at 95–96 (quoting Arthur v. Bokenham, 88 Eng. Rep. 957, 958 (C.P. 1709))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
276 9 P. 783, 786–87 (Colo. 1886).
277 Id. at 786 (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY
CRIMES § 131 (3d ed. 1901)).
278 2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 454, at 862 (John
Lewis ed., 2d ed. 1904).
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strued and will not be extended by construction beyond their natural
meaning.”279
The AIA was enacted during the “heyday” of the derogation canon,280
and neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts hesitated in
extending that canon to equity.  Indeed, no one appears to have noticed the
distinction.  Reinforcing the view that nineteenth-century courts—to the
extent they thought about it—viewed equity and the common law as apiece
when it came to giving them deference for purposes of statutory interpreta-
tion, Judge Cooley endorsed an equity derogation canon of sorts.  In Remedies
for Illegal Taxation, he wrote that Congress, in enacting remedy-limiting stat-
utes, “must recognise the same equitable principles which governed
before.”281
Nor was this resort to equitable principles good for one day and one
statute only.  More recently, Samuel Bray has identified a trend in the
Supreme Court to return to the old, historical distinctions between law and
equity.282  Bray has also identified an equity clear statement rule, showing
that the Court has insulated its new equity jurisprudence from congressional
revision by employing a clear statement canon: absent a clear statement to
the contrary, the Court will not read a statute as derogating from traditional
equity.283
Following Standard Nut, the federal courts continued to cite equity as
grounds to construe the AIA narrowly.  The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment
Act, for example, imposed processing taxes on farm products as a means of
providing revenue for farm support payments.284  Farm processors sought
injunctive relief en masse, and the vast majority of federal district courts
found equitable grounds, such as multiplicity of suits, sufficient to avoid
application of the AIA.285  In doing so, one federal court remarked, “It
should be observed that [the AIA] is simply declaratory of a long-established
principle of equity invoked by the courts in many cases antedating the enact-
ment of this statute.”286
When the processing cases arrived at the federal courts of appeals, the
derogation canon as applied to equity led the appellate courts to hold that
the AIA did not bar review.  After canvassing the caselaw, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the AIA “is not as inclusive as it appears”; the statute “is not
279 Id.
280 ESKRIDGE, supra note 103, at 956.
281 T.M. Cooley, Remedies of Illegal Taxation, 29 AM. L. REG. 1, 16 (1881).
282 See Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015). 
283 Cf. Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2014).
284 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
285 Note, supra note 104, at 109–11.
286 Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D. Minn. 1935).
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an absolute bar in every case to injunctive relief.”287  The Fifth Circuit took a
similar view:
The enactment . . . was merely declaratory of the prior rule that courts of
equity will not restrain the collection of a tax upon the sole ground of its
illegality.  The rule is not absolute, and is inapplicable in extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances.  The absence of a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy at law to pay the illegal tax and sue to recover it raises an indepen-
dent ground to support injunctive relief in equity.  Such ancient equitable
relief was not abrogated by the above statute which is construed in harmony
with the former equitable doctrine.288
When a farm-processing case reached the Supreme Court, the Court
took the highly unusual action of granting petitioners’ “motions for injunc-
tion restraining the collection of the assailed tax” pending certiorari.289  The
Court gave no rationale for its injunction, but as the Eighth Circuit noted, it
presumably “was granted because a majority of the Supreme Court were of
opinion that the remedy provided for recovery of the tax in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act . . . was inadequate.”290  The very existence of the inadequacy
exception turns, of course, on an equitable reading of the AIA.
This caselaw did not go unnoticed.  Shortly after the AIA was enacted in
1867, and both before and after Standard Nut, scholars wrote that the AIA
codified common law principles.  Writing in 1923, one commentator argued
that the AIA “made no changes whatever in the common law,” and “[t]he
statute took from the courts no power which they before its passage were
wont to exercise.  The rule today is the same as it was then.  The general
principles of equity apply.”291  As for two of the most influential treatises at
the time, Pomeroy’s on equity and Cooley’s on taxation, both published in
1881, neither so much as mentions the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867.292  The
failure of either treatise to discuss the AIA signals that the authors did not
view the AIA as working a major change in the law—rules of equity would
287 Huston v. Iowa Soap Co., 85 F.2d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1936) (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
288 Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Page, 81 F.2d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1936) (citation omit-
ted) (citing Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 498 (1932)); see also Kin-
gan & Co. v. Smith, 16 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Ind. 1936); Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Nee, 12 F.
Supp. 395, 399 (W.D. Mo. 1935) (“[The AIA] does not prohibit a suit in equity to restrain
the collection of a tax where the tax is illegally exacted and where the taxpayer has no
adequate remedy at law for its recovery if it is paid by him; and [such remedy] must be not
only adequate; it must be clear and unquestioned”).
289 Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 296 U.S. 569 (1935).
290 Huston, 85 F.2d at 656.
291 Gall, supra note 150, at 203–04; see also Miller, supra note 150, at 339 (granting an
injunction to restrain the collection of federal taxes but limiting such relief to special situa-
tions—such as when “the taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law to recover back the taxes
paid”).
292 Judge Cooley does write that statutes may prohibit tax injunction suits and cites to
Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (No. 11,463), but does not discuss
the AIA, and assumes that tax challenges may go forward in some circumstances. See supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
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continue to govern tax injunction suits.  Judge Cooley said as much, arguing
that while Congress might condition tax injunction suits, it “cannot take away
all remedy without providing a new one, and whatever is provided it is con-
ceived must recognize the same equitable principles which governed
before.”293
An equitable view of the AIA dominated the federal courts until the
1960s.294  It was not until Williams Packing that the Supreme Court held that
the AIA did something more than codify the rules that govern equity jurisdic-
tion.  In that case, the Court appeared to limit the various equitable grounds
upon which a taxpayer could bring suit notwithstanding the AIA.295  But that
limitation was a break with, not a return to, prior precedent.  Moreover, as
argued above, the limited exception itself indicates that the AIA is not juris-
dictional, because the federal courts are not authorized to carve out any
exception to a jurisdictional statute.
In summary, early interpretations of the AIA can be explained by refer-
ence to background equitable rules.  Equity makes sense out of the Supreme
Court’s AIA caselaw and its repeated invocation of equitable exceptions.  And
since objections to equitable jurisdiction may be waived and forfeited, it also
explains the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the AIA to permit waiver.296
V. LITIGATING UNDER AN EQUITABLE AIA
What does all of this mean for today?  What are the consequences of a
nonjurisdictional AIA?  Does it matter that, for the first 100 years or so of its
history, the Supreme Court interpreted the AIA to articulate a bar on equita-
ble jurisdiction?
I submit that a careful review of the caselaw establishes, at the least, that
the AIA is not jurisdictional.  The Supreme Court’s revisionist turn to text,
structure, and context destabilizes the current consensus.  These factors and
early interpretations of the AIA all reject a jurisdictional reading.  This is an
important conclusion in its own right because of the dramatic consequences
293 Cooley, supra note 281, at 16.
294 As late as 1948, equity scholars noted that extraordinary circumstances exceptions
to the AIA “have made possible a wide range of injunctions to restrain the collection of
federal taxes.” HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 476 (2d
ed. 1948).
295 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (“[I]f Congress
had desired to make the availability of the injunctive remedy against the collection of fed-
eral taxes not lawfully due upon the adequacy of the legal remedy, it would have said so
explicitly.”).
296 See, e.g., Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 n.1 (1939) (“Unlike the
objection that the court is without jurisdiction as a federal court, the parties may waive
their objections to the equity jurisdiction by consent . . . .” (citations omitted)); Duignan v.
United States, 274 U.S. 195, 199 (1927) (stating that failing to timely object to equity juris-
diction will constitute waiver); Am. Mills Co. v Am. Surety Co. of N.Y., 260 U.S. 360, 363
(1922) (stating that defendant’s failure to renew the motion to dismiss or insist on the
sufficiency of the first defense of its answer constituted a waiver); McGowan v. Parish, 237
U.S. 285, 295 (1915) (noting that a consent degree amounted to an express waiver).
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that attach to a jurisdictional statute.  Since the AIA does not speak to the
authority of the federal courts, waiver, forfeiture, and exceptions apply.
A return to text, structure, and context, moreover, makes it possible to
state a positive case for interpreting the AIA: the statute reinforces the rules
that govern equity jurisdiction.  But what does that mean?  This Part under-
takes a close analysis of the cases in which equity acted before and after the
AIA; from history’s vantage point, we get a picture of what it means to litigate
under an equitable AIA.297
To be clear, the term “equitable jurisdiction” is a bit of a misnomer.
Although it has often been said that a court of equity has “jurisdiction” only if
the remedy at law is inadequate,298 and cases are routinely dismissed “for
want of equity jurisdiction,”299 equity jurisdiction does not mean jurisdiction
in the fundamental sense of a court’s power to decide a case.300  Equity juris-
diction helps federal courts to determine whether a case in which they
already possess jurisdiction is an appropriate one for the exercise of the
extraordinary powers and remedies that exist in equity.301  Because equity
jurisdiction only determines when a court should act, rather than whether it
has power to act, actions taken without jurisdiction are not null and void or
ultra vires.302
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s early interpretation of the AIA as codi-
fying equitable principles may not be the most obvious—at least to today’s
readers.  The AIA’s terms do not admit of any exceptions, yet the Court inter-
preted the statute to have several.  A question at the outset is thus whether
the early Supreme Court got it right.  Was it legitimate to look to the equity
derogation canon then?  And why should we return to an equitable AIA,
297 An equitable AIA, while sharing some commonalities with partial or hybrid jurisdic-
tion, is a different species of jurisdiction altogether.  Advocates of partial or hybrid jurisdic-
tion envision jurisdictional requirements that have features of nonjurisdictional rules, too.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 165, 170 (1984) (arguing that defects in appellate jurisdiction should be waiv-
able and appellate jurisdiction conferred upon consent of the parties); Edward H. Cooper,
Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157,
157–63 (1984) (arguing for discretion in timing of appeals); Scott Dodson, Hybridizing
Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439 (2011) (proposing hybrid treatment for jurisdictional
rules).  Thus, a rule might be jurisdictional, but waivable.  Dodson, supra, at 1442.  The
AIA, in contrast, governs equity jurisdiction.
298 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 294, at 99.
299 See, e.g., Randolph v. Willis, 220 F. Supp. 355, 360–61 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
300 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, at § 129; see also Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY
296–380 (1950); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 180 (2d ed. 1993); MCCLINTOCK,
supra note 294, at 98–99.  The possibility that equity jurisdiction might refer to the power
of a court in a criminal case is a narrow circumstance not implicated in the tax context. See
1 DOBBS, supra, at 180; 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, at § 129.
301 Equitable jurisdiction speaks to cases “which form proper subjects for the exercise
of the powers of a chancery court.” MCCLINTOCK, supra note 294, at 98 (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (3d ed. 1933)); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 126 (equity juris-
diction refers to the “body of equity precedent and practice”).
302 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 294, at 98.
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especially when that meaning was influenced by the (now discredited) dero-
gation canon?  Although other scholars likely will debate the merits of the
equity derogation canon in general, this Article offers a few reasons in favor
of an equitable AIA.
First, an interpretation of the AIA in harmony with equity is consistent
with what we know of the statute.  We do not have much data concerning the
39th Congress’s enactment of the AIA in 1867, but what we do know suggests
that Congress did not mean radically to change the rules that governed tax
disputes.  That the provision garnered no attention in floor debates suggests
that Congress did not see the AIA as stripping the federal courts of pre-
enforcement jurisdiction—more important were the precise levels of recon-
struction taxes imposed on various goods like cotton.303  And it is telling that
the most influential tax and equity treatises of the time do not mention the
AIA.304  One would expect Professor Pomeroy and Judge Cooley to discuss at
length legislation designed to work a sea change in the way tax and equity
interacted, but neither of their 1881 treatises mention the AIA.305  Similarly,
the government’s arguments in early cases suggest that the administration
did not view the AIA as a strict jurisdictional bar, but rather one that could
(at a minimum) be waived by the government.306  And although the nine-
teenth-century Congress was active in reversing the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of federal tax law, the Court did not amend the AIA when the
federal courts interpreted it to permit equitable exceptions.
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisdictional jurisprudence also supports a
return to an equitable AIA.  The Court’s turn to text, structure, and context
makes clear that the AIA is not jurisdictional.  But more than that, it suggests
that a long line of precedent and practice regarding jurisdictional issues mat-
ter.  In direct opposition to the conventional wisdom, a line of surprisingly
consistent precedent suggests that the AIA governs the equitable jurisdiction
of the courts.
Further, while the derogation canon has been widely disparaged (and
for good reason307), the question is not how we would interpret the AIA were
the statute enacted today.  The slate is not blank.  And while we might expect
present-day courts to approach the statute differently in the first instance, it is
not at all surprising that early federal courts interpreted the AIA consistent
with general equitable principles.
303 See supra Section III.C.
304 Judge Cooley does write that statutes may prohibit tax injunction suits and cites to
Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (No. 11,463).  However, Cooley
does not discuss the AIA and assumes that tax challenges may go forward in some circum-
stances. See COOLEY, supra note 116, at 537.
305 COOLEY, supra note 116, at 537.
306 See supra notes 88–99.
307 Id.; see also Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories:
A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) (discussing the
rise and fall of the canon); Pound, Common Law, supra note 241, at 406–07 (discussing the
derogation doctrine and suggesting that common law should not be superior to
legislation).
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Statutes “cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.”308  The inter-
pretive methods of the day are relevant to a statute’s meaning.  At the time of
the AIA’s enactment, the federal courts deferred to common law rules in the
interpretation of statutes almost as a matter of course.309  Because Congress
legislated against this interpretive backdrop,310 the Supreme Court has held
the “landscape of the common law” relevant to the present-day judicial con-
struction of statutes from this time period.311  In short, the pervasiveness of
the derogation canon during the time period makes the equitable principles
that were in place before the AIA’s adoption important to that statute’s
interpretation.
Another justification for an equitable view of the AIA is the one sug-
gested by Bray in a different context: the interplay between legislative process
and the theory of remedies.312  The Act is not jurisdictional in the sense of
the term we now use.  But it must mean something.  Early interpretations of
that statute as codifying equitable rules give rise to a relatively defined set of
circumstances in which the AIA does not bar a pre-enforcement challenge to
a tax.313  Given the statute’s nonjurisdictional status, the only other interpre-
tive option left open to courts would be a hodgepodge of judicial exceptions
created on a case-by-case basis.  Jurisdictional boundaries are well served by
clarity, and the government and litigants alike would benefit from consis-
tency in the pre-enforcement review of tax challenges.  And of course Con-
gress may alter this interpretation of the AIA and provide guidance as to the
circumstances in which pre-enforcement tax challenges may be brought.314
Stability in the law counsels for an equitable AIA.
Finally, an equitable view of the AIA is wise policy.  Courts sitting in
equity were onto something when they gave wide berth to legislative bodies
for implementing and enforcing taxes and for raising the revenue necessary
for government operations.  But they also recognized the extraordinary
power of taxation and that circumstances might exist where a refund remedy
was inadequate; in these special cases, equity would intervene.  Further, the
taxing power was in its infancy at the time—the income tax was intermittent
and the idea of using the tax code in place of statutory commands was a
nonstarter (though today commonplace).  And while the pay-now, litigate-
later system makes sense when applied to revenue-raising measures, the gov-
ernment’s fiscal interests in summary and stringent enforcement do not
apply when the measure accomplishes a regulatory purpose.  It is important
too that a person is not ordinarily required to suffer the penalty from an
308 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983).
309 See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 60 (1999).
310 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330–34.
311 Id. at 355.
312 See supra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
313 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 127.
314 Given the enormity of the tax code, the AIA is the place to make such reforms, not a
“tax statute by tax statute” basis.
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unconstitutional statute in order to bring a challenge.  A jurisdictional AIA
makes that result all but inevitable: a taxpayer must pay the disputed tax to
have her day in court.  As the following Part demonstrates, however, an equi-
table AIA would permit tax challenges when the statutory refund remedy is
inadequate.
A. The Adequacy Exception
The lynchpin of “equitable jurisdiction” vis-a`-vis a tax challenge has
always been an inadequate remedy at law.  In the seminal case of Dows v.
Chicago, the Court wrote: “The equitable powers of the court can only be
invoked by the presentation of a case of equitable cognizance.  There can be
no such case, at least in the Federal courts, where there is a plain and ade-
quate remedy at law.”315
The adequacy rule can be traced to the division between law and equity.
Equity courts in England performed two primary functions.316  Equity some-
times acted to create new substantive rights that did not otherwise exist
under legal rules, such as mortgage protections for debtors and the fiduciary
duties required of trustees.317  It was more common, however, for courts sit-
ting in equity to act remedially, pairing an equitable remedy with a legal right
already recognized by common law courts.318  In the latter case, where equity
merely supplied a remedy for a preexisting legal right, equity jurisdiction
existed only if the legal remedies were deemed inadequate.319  That is, since
a legal right already existed, a party was able to go into a law court and get
some remedy; it was only when that remedy was inadequate that the courts of
equity had power to award equitable remedies.320
Courts of equity took care to justify their intervention in a legal action,
basing their authority on the inadequacy of the remedy at law.321  The ade-
quacy rule thus served a gatekeeping function, allowing courts of equity to
entertain legal claims and award equitable remedies where the common law
did not supply an adequate remedy.322  By using adequacy rhetoric, equity
courts sought to avoid at least the appearance of intruding into matters dele-
gated to the law courts.323
With the merger of law and equity, the importance of the adequacy test
has declined.324  Douglas Laycock and others have forcefully argued that,
since law and equity have merged, there is no need to deny equitable relief
315 Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 112 (1870).
316 See 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 130.
317 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 74–75.
318 Id.
319 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 216.
320 Id. § 217.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 124 (arguing that after the merger of law and equity
there is “no basis for continued use of the rule”).
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based on the historical gatekeeping function of the adequacy rule.  Since the
same judge sits in law as in equity, equity courts need no longer be wary of
intruding into common law matters.  Laycock further concludes that the rule
is irrelevant today, because the adequacy rule does not bar any plaintiff who
can demonstrate a plausible need for equitable relief.325  These arguments
have been widely regarded to be correct,326 but recently the Supreme Court
has placed more emphasis on the adequacy rule, and it has played a major
role in the Court’s remedial jurisprudence.327
Regardless of the adequacy rule’s general viability, it remains relevant in
the tax context.  The AIA was enacted before the merger of law and equity and
interpreted to allow only plaintiffs who satisfied some established head of
equity jurisdiction to proceed with a pre-enforcement challenge to a tax.
Since the law already provided a legal remedy, the only way a court of equity
would intervene was upon finding that legal remedy inadequate.  The AIA, in
other words, used the adequacy rule to police equity’s review of pre-enforce-
ment tax cases.  If an adequate remedy at law existed, then the challenge was
dismissed for want of equity jurisdiction.  If the remedy at law was inade-
quate, then a court sitting in equity could proceed to adjudicate the pre-
enforcement challenge and grant relief to a meritorious taxpayer.  To deter-
mine whether the AIA bars pre-enforcement review, then, depends upon
whether the remedy at law is adequate.
The circumstances in which traditional equity might act, and thus the
circumstances in which the AIA permits pre-enforcement tax challenges, are
limited.328  It has always been clear that neither “the mere illegality of the tax
complained of, nor its injustice nor irregularity, of themselves, give the right
to an injunction in a court of equity.”329  Under equitable rules, then, the
pre-enforcement review of a tax was possible only when “special circum-
stances” brought the case under the court’s equitable jurisdiction.  Although
courts often recited that any “head of equity jurisdiction”—fraud, mistake,
and accident, for example—would suffice to bring the case within equity’s
purview,330 the three grounds most often recognized by courts sitting in
equity to enjoin taxation were irreparable mischief, multiplicity of suits, and
325 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 23.
326 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 58.
327 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding that per-
manent injunction relief requires a showing that, among other things, “remedies at law are
inadequate to compensate”); see also Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206 (2012) (discuss-
ing the eBay case and the various factors the Court considers when contemplating injunc-
tive relief).
328 See Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591, 597 (1891) (“[T]he strong arm of the Court of
Chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that court is
grounded upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction.”).
329 State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613 (1875).
330 Shelton, 139 U.S. at 594–96.
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cloud on real estate title.331  Each is an application of the adequate remedy
at law requirement.
1. Multiplicity of Suit
During the nineteenth century, multiplicity of suit was a common
ground for equitable jurisdiction over a tax challenge.332  The “chief object”
of multiplicity of suit jurisdiction is to avoid the hardship of prosecuting mul-
tiple suits by facilitating “a complete and final remedy by one equitable
decree.”333  Pomeroy explains that the multiplicity of suit doctrine originated
in bills of peace brought to establish a general right between a party (usually
a landlord) and numerous other persons claiming distinct individual inter-
ests (usually tenants).334  Multiplicity of suit jurisdiction also obtained in
quiet title actions when a single equitable decree would prevent repeated
ejectment actions.335  These categories gave rise to two different fact patterns
where an inadequate remedy at law based on multiplicity of suit could be
alleged: (1) where a number of people have similar but individual claims
against the same party; and (2) where a single plaintiff might be required to
bring more than one lawsuit to protect his legal rights.336
To fast forward to the present day, it is hard to envision a case under
either category in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—rules
modeled largely on procedures borrowed from equity337—would not provide
an adequate remedy.  From Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14’s third-party
practice, to Rule 19 and 20’s joinder of parties and Rule 18’s joinder of
claims, to Rule 22’s interpleader and Rule 24’s intervention, to Rule 23’s class
and mass action procedures, legal remedies for multiple parties338 and multi-
ple claims339 are now commonplace.  Because the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provide a means to decide multiple claims by multiple parties in one
331 Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 110 (1870) (“No court of equity will, therefore,
allow its injunction to issue to restrain [a tax], except where . . . [the taxpayer] has no
adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law.  It must appear that the enforce-
ment of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, or
where the property is real estate, [and would] throw a cloud upon the title . . . .”); see also 1
DOBBS, supra note 300, at 58–61; 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 243.
332 See 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 243.
333 Id. § 266.  In Hill v. Wallace, for example, Congress placed a transactional tax on the
sale of grain futures contracts that would apply each time one of the 1600 members of the
Board of Trade sold grain for future delivery. See 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922).  The Supreme
Court found that a suit for each transaction would be impracticable and that the AIA was
inapplicable. Id.; see also Cummings v. Nat’l Bank, 101 U.S. 153, 157 (1879); 1 DOBBS,
supra note 300, at 130.
334 See 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 245.
335 See id.
336 See id. § 243.
337 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987).
338 FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 20, 24.
339 FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 18.
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lawsuit, multiplicity of suit should not often (if ever) be grounds for equitable
jurisdiction in a modern tax case.340
2. Cloud on Title
During the late-nineteenth century, “cloud on title” was often recited as
a basis for equitable jurisdiction over a tax claim.  A “cloud” on title occurs
when an invalid legal instrument appears to encumber the title.341  As a
result, courts sitting in equity routinely would act to cancel and annul tax
certificates issued for a void tax,342 to enjoin the sale of land for illegal
taxes,343 and to enjoin the execution and delivery of a land deed sold at an
invalid tax sale.344
Through a plethora of exceptions, the AIA permits parties whose prop-
erty has been levied to test the validity of the tax prior to a tax sale.345
Because such a taxpayer has an adequate remedy at law to remove any cloud
on title, equity jurisdiction would not exist, and taxpayers are left with the
specific remedies identified as exceptions in the text of the AIA.
3. Irreparable Mischief
The head of equitable jurisdiction most likely to permit a pre-enforce-
ment tax challenge today is the irreparable mischief, or irreparable injury,
basis of jurisdiction.  At the outset, Laycock, as well as other scholars, have
made a persuasive case that “irreparable injury” has become meaningless:
when the issue is remedial, as in the tax context, the adequacy and irrepara-
bility rules mean the same thing.346  Irreparability is simply evidence of inad-
equacy: “irreparable injury” or “irreparable mischief” cases, that is, illustrate
factual situations, which give rise to an inadequate remedy at law.347
340 See 1 POMEROY, supra note 116, § 266 n.2.
341 See, e.g., Bissell v. Kellogg, 60 Barb. 617, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1871), aff’d, 65 N.Y. 432
(1875).
342 See, e.g., Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis. 51, 57 (1871).
343 See State ex rel. Bayha v. Kansas City Court of Appeals, 10 S.W. 855, 858 (Mo. 1889);
Milwaukee Iron Co., 29 Wis. at 52.
344 See, e.g., Crooke v. Andrews, 40 N.Y. 547, 547 (1869).
345 Before any property is subject to levy under the tax code, the taxpayer is entitled to
notice and a hearing.  26 U.S.C. § 6330(a)(1) (2012).  The AIA authorizes federal courts to
enjoin any levy proceeding until such hearing has been held.  26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 6672(c)(2) (stating that courts may enjoin levy of responsible person pay-
ments); § 6694(c)(1) (stating that courts may enjoin a levy imposed on tax preparers).
Notwithstanding the AIA, the district courts also may grant an injunction to prohibit the
enforcement of any levy of third-party property.  26 U.S.C. § 7426(b)(1); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 6331(i) (forbidding a levy on property pursuant to an indivisible-tax deficiency).  And
notwithstanding the AIA, 26 U.S.C. § 7429(b) grants jurisdiction to the federal courts to
review any jeopardy or levy assessments.  26 U.S.C. § 7429(b)(2)(A).
346 See Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065,
1070–71 (1979) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978)).
347 See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687,
688 (1990).
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The key to litigating under an equitable AIA, then, is to recognize the
factual circumstances that give rise to an inadequate remedy at law and to
permit a pre-enforcement tax challenge.  As relevant to tax litigation, “irrepa-
rable mischief” cases tend to fall within one of three categories: severe eco-
nomic injury, unique rights or entitlements, and third-party taxpayers.
Severe Economic Injury.  In extreme cases, the destruction of a business
interest may warrant equitable jurisdiction.348 Standard Nut, for example,
presents unique circumstances.  In that case, Standard Nut sold its butter sub-
stitute in reliance on the IRS’s determination that the taxes levied by the
Oleomargarine Act did not apply.349  Eighteen months later, the IRS
changed its mind and assessed a back tax.350  The back taxes were far more
than the company could pay,351 and the Supreme Court held that “the
enforcement of the act against respondent would be arbitrary and oppres-
sive, would destroy its business, ruin it financially, and inflict loss for which it
would have no remedy at law.”352
Civil and Political Rights.  The loss of a civil or political right often means
that damages at law are inadequate.353  This is because these sorts of rights
are irreplaceable,354 and since the harm is nonmonetary, it is difficult to esti-
mate an amount of damages.355  For both of these reasons, equitable relief is
routinely available to prevent the loss of a unique right or entitlement.
The prototypical irreplaceability case is land.  Because each parcel is
considered unique, its loss is irreplaceable.  No other piece of property would
be an adequate replacement, and no amount of damages that could be used
348 See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205–06 (2d Cir.
1970) (granting injunction because of irreparable business harm); AIM Int’l Trading, LLC
v. Valcucine Spa, 188 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding irreparable harm
where plaintiff’s business would be “wiped out”); Canterbury Career Sch., Inc. v. Riley, 833
F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (D.N.J. 1993) (“[D]estruction of an ongoing business . . . generally
constitutes irreparable injury.”); Goldstein v. Miller, 488 F. Supp. 156, 175 (D. Md. 1980)
(“[W]hen the potential economic loss is so great as to threaten the existence of the moving
party’s business, then an injunction may be granted, even though the amount of direct
financial harm is readily ascertainable.”).
349 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 505 (1932).
350 See id. at 505.
351 Id. at 505–06.  The tax was also imposed in a discriminatory manner, as other com-
panies had not been pursued for back taxes. Id. at 510.
352 Id. at 510–11.  Additionally, the destruction of a business interest might give rise to
an inadequate remedy at law if damages are difficult to value. See Allen v. Balt. & Ohio
R.R., 114 U.S. 311, 311 (1885) (enjoining the sale of critical machinery); Osborn v. Bank of
the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 739 (1824) (holding an injunction warranted where
taxation would result in the denial of a franchise to do business in the state).
353 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 41.
354 Id. at 41–42.
355 Id. at 37.
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to purchase such property is adequate.  As a result, the standard remedy is
the equitable one of specific performance.356
The same is true for constitutional values.357  Damages at law are inade-
quate for the loss of a civil or political right both because the rights are irre-
placeable and because they are difficult to value.358  No matter the sum, a
taxpayer cannot use a damages award to replace the loss of her civil rights.
She cannot buy back the right to vote,359 or the right to be free from an
unreasonable search and seizure,360 any more than she can buy back her
right to free speech,361 or religious liberty.362  Furthermore, these sorts of
intangible values are never bought or sold on any market and come with
356 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 130, 134; see also Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th
Cir. 1965) (holding an officer in contempt for violating an injunction not to interfere with
the rights of blacks to use public accommodations).
357 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 130, 134; see also Paulsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d
65, 65 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that even minimal loss of First Amendment rights would be
irreparable harm and justifying an injunction against interference with distribution of
leaflets).
358 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 41.
359 See id. at 60 (citing Quinn v. Missouri., 839 F.2d 425, 425 (8th Cir. 1988) (enjoining
exclusion of nonproperty owners from local governing board)); see also Bell v. Southwell,
376 F.2d 659, 659 (5th Cir. 1967) (involving a case of racial segregation in a polling place);
Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215, 215–16 (5th Cir. 1966) (involving racial discrimination
in voter registration); Schrenker v. Clifford, 387 N.E.2d 59, 59 (Ind. 1979) (involving the
mailing of absentee ballots to addresses within the county); O’Connors v. Helfgott, 481
A.2d 388, 394 (R.I. 1984) (“No amount of monetary damages can rectify this vote
dilution.”).
360 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 62 (citing Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1345 (3d Cir.
1971) (involving police stops of cars driven by long-haired males)); see also Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) (involving mass searches on anonymous tips).
361 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 61 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)
(“[The] loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestion-
ably constitutes irreparable injury.”)); see also Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814–15
(1974) (plurality opinion) (involving the suppression of a union organizing campaign and
concluding with the Court granting an injunction); Miss. Women’s Med. Clinic v. McMil-
lan, 866 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to enjoin picketing at abortion clinic
because an injunction would irreparably injure defendants); Mariani Giron v. Acevedo
Ruiz, 834 F.2d 238, 239 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving a politically motivated discharge from
public employment); Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that, with the removal of newspaper racks, the “prevention of access to a public
forum is, each day, an irreparable injury”).
362 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 61–62 (citing Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v.
Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving access to a public forum, where
an injunction was granted without discussing irreparable injury)); see also Islamic Ctr. of
Miss. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving discriminatory zon-
ing, where an injunction was granted without discussion); ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794
F.2d 265, 274–75 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving a lighted cross on a city firehouse); Lily of the
Valley Spiritual Church v. Sims, 523 N.E.2d 999, 999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (involving disrup-
tion of church services, where an injunction was granted without discussion of irreparable
injury).
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intractable valuation problems.363  As Wright and Miller explain, because the
loss of a constitutional right is unique, “most courts hold that no further
showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”364  Since the loss of such rights is
irreplaceable and damages at law inadequate, injunctions are the standard
remedy in civil rights cases.365
Third Party Situations.  The legal refund remedy also may be inadequate
where the incidence of the tax falls on a third party who is unable to utilize
the statutory refund remedy.  The earliest AIA decisions involved this cate-
gory of inadequacy—the federal courts permitted shareholders to sue to
enjoin a corporate tax because they had no means to seek a refund once the
tax had been voluntarily paid.366  The Supreme Court’s recent cases have cut
back on this traditional equitable head of jurisdiction, requiring only an
“alternative legal avenue.”367  But the equitable tradition is clear: the remedy
at law must not only exist, it must be adequate.368  A legal remedy is adequate
only if it is “complete, practical, and efficient” as the equitable remedy.369  In
brief, where a party is burdened by, but unable fully to challenge a tax, equity
jurisdiction obtains, and the AIA does not pose a bar to the taxpayer’s pre-
enforcement challenge.
4. Williams Packing and Regan
Reading the AIA consistent with precedent reveals problems with the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Williams Packing and Regan.  Equity permits
pre-enforcement tax challenges in broader circumstances than those cases
contemplate.
In 1962, when the Supreme Court redefined the equitable exceptions to
which the AIA might be subject, it all but eliminated them. Williams Packing
reversed centuries of precedent and practice holding that certain irreparable
harms might permit a pre-enforcement tax challenge and held that the AIA
barred pre-enforcement actions unless there were “no circumstances” under
which the government might prevail.370  The question of whether the gov-
ernment will have a chance to prevail, moreover, is to be decided at the time
363 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 41.
364 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948
(2d ed. 1973); see also Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that in
the case of the deprivation of a constitutional right “most courts hold that no further show-
ing of irreparable injury is necessary”); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Sylacauga, 436 F.
Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (“Deprivations of constitutional rights are usually held to
constitute irreparable injury as a matter of law.”).
365 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 41–42.
366 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 429 (1895) (concern-
ing whether a diversion of corporate funds to an invalid tax may be enjoined), reh’g granted
and opinion vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
367 South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984).
368 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 22–23.
369 Id. at 22.
370 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
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the government assesses the tax and under “the most liberal view of the law
and the facts.”371
The recent decision in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company
illustrates the narrowness of the Williams Packing exception.  Plaintiffs in that
case sought a refund of a coal export tax that had been held unconstitu-
tional.372  The IRS acquiesced.373  Although no one disputed that the coal
tax was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court found that the “under no cir-
cumstances” test was not satisfied since the district court decision invalidating
the tax had relied in part on Supreme Court cases that postdated the tax
assessment.374  As a result, it was not “obvious” that the government had no
chance of prevailing—at least when it had assessed the tax.375
For its part, Regan is a cramped interpretation of the inadequate remedy
at law predicate to equity jurisdiction. Regan held that the AIA was not
intended to bar a tax challenge where “Congress has not provided the plain-
tiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax.”376  The
quintessential Regan case involves a challenger who is burdened by, but does
not ultimately bear the incidence of, a tax.  In such case, the refund remedy
is unavailable and the taxpayer has no alternate remedy at law. Regan does
not contemplate a challenge when a taxpayer is challenging her own tax.  As
the Supreme Court’s early AIA cases show, however, the legal refund remedy
may nevertheless be inadequate.  In short, Regan’s “alternative remedy”377
must be replaced with equity’s “adequate remedy.”
B. Waiver and Forfeiture
That the AIA governs equity jurisdiction will also allow the govern-
ment—as it has in times past—to determine whether the purposes of the AIA
are best served by prompt resolution.  An objection that the court of equity is
not the proper forum may be waived, and indeed is deemed waived, if not
raised at the earliest proper stage of the proceedings.378  As a result, the gov-
ernment may decide to waive the AIA and seek a decision on the merits,
when such a decision would aid in the overall goal of efficient tax collection.
As Congress enacts more of its policies through the tax code, the availa-
bility of waiver will become all the more important.  Waiver, for example,
would have greatly simplified things in the NFIB litigation.  The government
could have been forthright in its waiver of the AIA, and the Court could have
371 United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2008) (quoting
Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7).
372 Id. at 5–6.
373 Id. at 6.
374 See id. at 14.
375 Id.
376 South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984) (emphasis added).
377 Id. at 374, 377.
378 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 294, at 99 (citing Insley v. United States, 150 U.S. 512
(1893); Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889); Maxwell v. Frazier, 96 P. 548 (Or. 1908);
Hoff v. Olson, 76 N.W. 1121 (Wis. 1898)).
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proceeded to the merits without determining that the § 5000A penalty was a
tax for one purpose (constitutional) and not for another (statutory).379
C. Equitable Discretion
A key feature of equity is discretion—even as to jurisdiction.  The tradi-
tional discretion afforded to courts of equity to grant, deny, or craft remedies
also extends to an equity court’s decision whether to hear a case.380  Because
the system of equity treats access to equitable rights and remedies as a “privi-
lege,” even where a plaintiff establishes that the remedy at law is inadequate,
a court sitting in equity may in its discretion refuse to hear the case.381  This
one-way discretion382 will allow federal courts, once they have determined
that the remedy at law is inadequate, to consider whether pre-enforcement
review of a tax is an appropriate exercise of their equitable jurisdiction.  Fed-
eral courts may consider both the government’s interest in the prompt col-
lection of revenues and the disruption a pre-enforcement lawsuit would
occasion.
CONCLUSION
The Anti-Injunction Act has never been more important.  Congress has
and will increasingly pursue many of its behavior-shaping goals through the
tax code.  Whether an individual can seek pre-enforcement review will
depend upon the status of the AIA.  A spate of federal court decisions and
the academic commentary leaves little room for the argument that the AIA is
jurisdictional.  Yet, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the AIA is not an
absolute bar on the pre-enforcement review of taxes.  It governs the equitable
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  This changes the landscape of pre-enforce-
ment tax litigation: a taxpayer may challenge a tax if the government waives
or forfeits reliance on the AIA, as well as in circumstances where Congress
has not provided an adequate remedy at law and equity jurisdiction otherwise
exists.
379 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–96 (2012).
380 1 DOBBS, supra note 300, at 12.
381 Id. at 57.
382 Id. at 127 (arguing that the adequacy rule is “fixed and definite”—where a remedy
at law is adequate, the claim must be dismissed).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 54  8-DEC-14 14:35
134 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
